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ABSTRACT 
Dissuasion is a strategy for persuading adversaries to seek acceptable alternatives 
to building threatening capabilities or adopting hostile intentions towards the United 
States.  Dissuasion is a framework for organizing strategy directed at dealing with future 
threats.  As such, it compliments other traditional national strategies (such as deterrence 
or coercion), and uses deterrence, coercion, and even appeasement, to meet overall policy 
goals. 
Dissuasion as a strategy was not formally articulated until it appeared in the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review.  Despite dissuasion’s comparatively recent recognition, its 
historical use by states attempting to influence geopolitical rivals has been frequent.  
Dissuasion is stated as a primary strategy in the capstone national security documents of 
the United States, but clear guidelines on how dissuasion can be implemented are 
lacking. 
This study expands the understanding of dissuasion as a strategy, examining three 
historical instances where it was used by states seeking to influence the behavior or 
military force structure building of other states, bringing dissuasion out of the realm of 
theory and into the real-world.  Tools and procedures are described in order to 
“operationalize” dissuasion, the role of naval forces in dissuasion is scrutinized, and the 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION TO DISSUASION 
A. DISSUASION   
In the twenty-first century, the United States will increasingly encounter regional 
powers that are neither friend nor enemy, while concurrently dealing with outright hostile 
powers, such as Iran, and potential peer competitors such as China.  Dissuasion offers 
policymakers a strategy for influencing other states before conflict breaks out or tensions 
rise by steering other nations away from pursuing policies inimical to U.S. interests, such 
as the development of nuclear weapons.   
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that “dissuasion” is a stratagem for 
persuading potential adversaries to seek alternatives to building threatening capabilities 
and adopting hostile intentions towards the United States.1  While dissuasion is as a key 
element of the capstone document of U.S. strategy, it is not clear how to systematically 
implement dissuasion.  The term first appeared in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, 
but so far, there has been little discussion of how policymakers can craft a dissuasion plan 
to meet strategic goals.  This thesis explores dissuasion as a strategy, and offers 
suggestions for operational implementation of the concept.  At the heart of this thesis are 
three historical case studies: 
• The successful dissuasion of Libya by the United States, resulting in Libya 
abandoning of its attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
capabilities. 
• The successful British dissuasion of outside interference in the nascent 
Baltic States following World War I, which resulted in the formation of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
• The unsuccessful attempt in the first decade of the twentieth century by 
Britain to dissuade Germany from building a fleet that threatened the 
Royal Navy’s maritime supremacy.   
 
The case studies reveal that dissuasion, despite the fact that few observers 
recognized it as a distinct concept until 2001, has been habitually used by states seeking 
to change policies it finds objectionable in other states.     
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 
2005). 
2 
U.S. military strength traditionally lies in the spheres of strategic deterrence and 
major warfighting.  Indeed, American domination of the conventional battlefield is so 
complete that most adversaries will opt to “push toward the edge” of the warfighting 
spectrum, by seeking asymmetric alternatives to conventional battle or pursuing Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs.  Through dissuasion, the United States can 
influence other nations and international actors to step away from developing policies and 
capabilities, both conventional and asymmetric, which threaten vital U.S. interests.      
Dissuasion is separate from, but complementary to, deterrence.  Deterrence 
threatens violence, usually in retaliation for a hostile act, and is operationalized against 
current threats.  Dissuasion seeks to persuade others to take a different path, or not start 
down one, and is thus aimed at future threats.  Both may occur simultaneously—China, 
for instance, may be deterred from using nuclear weapons by the threat of strategic 
nuclear retaliation, while being simultaneously dissuaded from building and deploying a 
blue-water navy.  The essential difference between deterrence and dissuasion is the 
target: existing capabilities and behaviors are the objective for deterrence; future 
capabilities and behavior are targeted by dissuasion.  Dissuasion need not be passive or 
non-aggressive: as the case studies demonstrate, coercion and other active strategies are 
frequently used as part of an overall dissuasion strategy. 
Dissuading future behavior and capability building is difficult, at best.  States may 
simply refuse to be dissuaded due to their strategic culture, or may adopt an alternate path 
equally inimical to American interests.  Poorly thought out dissuasion policies may in 
fact have the reverse effect of that intended by triggering a “security dilemma” response 
in the target, driving it to building threatening military capabilities as a counter to 




                                                 
2 John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 2 (1950): 157-8.  
The “security dilemma” is a response to a military buildup or action from a potential rival.  A given state 
may perceive even a defensive buildup as a threat, and accordingly start its own buildup, triggering an arms 
race.          
3 
Potential tools for implementing a dissuasion policy include:  
• Presence and engagement, both military and diplomatic, which signal 
U.S. commitment and willingness to defend vital interests, builds state-to-
state relationships, secures the “global commons” of the high seas, and 
provides a ready force to address problems before they harden into major 
crises.         
• Controlling the spread of technology and arms, which prevents 
acquisition of the materials needed to build threatening capabilities, 
accomplished through arms control regimes, export controls, sanctions, 
interdiction, and blockade.   
• Conditional support or threatened withdrawal of support—moral, 
economic, or military—granted upon condition of desired behavior, or 
withdrawn to punish undesirable behavior.   
• Economic influence, such as the direct pressure of sanctions, and 
promoting ties to prominent segments of the target society that can be 
leveraged to influence policy.    
• Erecting barriers to competition, usually through presenting such an 
overwhelming force or technological lead that an opponent will conclude 
that effective competition is impossible. 
 
Aside from the broader view, this study also offers insights into the use of naval 
forces in dissuasion.  Naval forces are well suited to dissuasion: they are inherently 
fungible across the spectrum of warfare, able to go from low-key presence operations to 
full-scale warfare on short notice.  They can quickly move strategic distances to exert 
pressure, and are less threatening to uninvolved states and allies than forward-based land 
forces.  Presence and engagement are long-standing roles for the U.S. Navy, and the 
Navy also plays a part in controlling the spread of technology and arms through 
interdiction and blockade.  Maritime forces can be used to provide conditional support 
without a vast commitment of ground forces, and can be quickly withdrawn from the 
scene once crisis conditions fade.  Navies can exert economic influence through blockade 
and enforcement of economic sanctions, while warship sales also offer influence by 
leveraging the support infrastructure that comes with these highly complex systems, and 
promoting military-to-military ties.  Finally, the overwhelming superiority of the U.S. 
Navy, if maintained, presents an insurmountable barrier to competition, dissuading other 
states from making the attempt.                  
4 
Dissuasion compliments other national strategies (such as deterrence or coercion) 
but also uses deterrence, coercion, and even appeasement as part of an overall long-term 
strategy of dissuasion.  The following section describes how dissuasion fits in with other 
strategies in shaping the security environment: 
 
B. SHAPING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Dissuasion is a tool for policy makers to shape the international security 
environment into a form favorable to U.S. interests.  The National Defense Strategy and 
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review lay out the security challenges ahead for the 
United States: 
The strategy acknowledges that although the U.S. military maintains 
considerable advantages in traditional forms of warfare, this realm is not 
the only, or even the most likely, one in which adversaries will challenge 
the United States during the period immediately ahead. Enemies are more 
likely to pose asymmetric threats, including irregular, catastrophic and 
disruptive challenges. Some, such as non-state actors, will choose irregular 
warfare – including terrorism, insurgency or guerrilla warfare – in an 
attempt to break our will through protracted conflict. Some states, and 
some non-state actors, will pursue WMD to intimidate others or murder 
hundreds of thousands of people. Finally, some states may seek 
capabilities designed to disrupt or negate traditional U.S. military 
advantages…3 
To operationalize the National Defense Strategy, four priority areas are identified: 
− Defeating terrorist networks. 
− Defending the homeland in depth. 
− Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads. 
− Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using 
WMD.4 
 
These four priorities are aimed at four distinct challenges: irregular challenges, 
such as terrorists or insurgencies; catastrophic challenges such as rouge state or terrorist 
acquisition of WMD; traditional military challenges from a rising near-peer competitor; 
and disruptive challenges that leverage unforeseen technologies to defeat U.S. 
                                                 
3 Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (2006), 19. 
4 Ibid. 
5 
conventional advantages.  The relationship between priorities, challenges, and the forces 
needed to deal with them are illustrated in Figure 1:                
 
 
Figure 1.   Challenges Facing the United States.5 
 
Dissuasion is but one tool available to policy makers in shaping the international 
security environment.  Others include appeasement, assurance, deterrence and coercion.  
Collectively, these strategies can be seen as part of a continuum, extending from 
appeasement at the least aggressive end, to active war at the most aggressive end. All of 
these strategies can be employed actively or passively, they may be used simultaneously 
against the same target.  Each strategy is briefly defined below: 
 
1. Appeasement   
Appeasement is the act of granting concessions to promote good relations 
between states.  Despite routine use in diplomatic interaction, the term appeasement, “is 
the political equivalent of a swear word,” Daniel Moran writes, “…to accuse someone of 
appeasement is to associate him or her with a historical episode [Munich] whose meaning 
is thought to be beyond dispute, and whose lessons are so plain that only a fool could fail 
                                                 
5 Quadrennial Defense Review, 19. 
6 
to heed them.”6  The conventional wisdom that “appeasement only leads to more 
aggression” is an article of faith in American policy circles, but a more thoughtful 
examination reveals that in certain circumstances appeasement can be an effective policy.  
Granting concessions and conciliation toward adversaries must be a part of diplomatic 
discourse; if this were not the case, all state interaction would end in war.  In the 
nineteenth century, for instance, Great Britain appeased Washington by granting 
territorial concessions along the northern border of the United States, which allowed 
Britain to re-deploy military forces to home waters in order to meet the looming German 
threat.         
  
2. Assurance   
Assurance, whether informal or by treaty, is used to support allies and friends, 
most often by offering a pledge of military or diplomatic help when needed.  Assurance is 
closely associated with extended deterrence, as in the extension of the U.S. nuclear 
deterrence umbrella over Western Europe during the Cold War.  Today, assurance plays 
an important role in calming fears among America’s allies in Asia, especially when North 
Korea rattles their nuclear arsenal.   
 
3. Deterrence 
Deterrence threatens force in response to aggressive acts.  Deterrence attempts to 
convince an adversary that the costs of perusing a particular course of action outweigh 
the benefits; that action x will result in retaliation y, which will be more painful than any 
benefit accrued. Deterrence may be undertaken as a long-term strategic policy, as in the 
case of nuclear deterrence against Russia, or it may be applied to immediate crisis 
situations, such as the stationing of two U.S. carrier battle groups in the South China Sea 
during the 1996 Taiwan Straights Crisis. 
While deterrence is related to dissuasion, the key difference lies in the intended 
target.  Deterrence is the effort to prevent an opponent from using existing capabilities to 
undertake some undesirable policy or action; dissuasion is the effort to prevent an 
                                                 
6 Daniel Moran, “Appeasement,” Strategic Insights Vol. 2 (April 2003): 1.  Available from 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/apr03/strategy.asp (accessed April 2006).  
7 
adversary or potential adversary from taking steps to obtain threatening capabilities, or to 
undertake policies that that will be harmful to U.S. interests in the future.      
         
4. Coercion  
Coercion or compelence strategies use active military force, short of war, to 
achieve policy objectives by forcing a weaker foe to yield.  To use a term currently out of 
vogue—for a policy still very much still in use—coercion is “gunboat diplomacy.”  
Author James Cable lists over 175 instances of the use of force in situations short of war 
between 1945 and 1991, including the U.S. ejection of Cuban forces form Granada in 
1981, and the Royal Navy’s aggressive escort of British trawlers during the Cod Wars 
with Iceland in the 1970s.7  Coercion—most often used by stronger nations against 
weaker states—is fraught with danger and unintended consequences, and hence must be 
used carefully.  A key consideration when contemplating coercion is the correlation of 
forces.  As Cable points out, placing naval squadrons off the shores of the collapsing 
Soviet Union in 1991 to take advantage of whatever opportunities that that came up, as 
the Royal Navy did in 1919 off the coasts of the collapsing Russian state, would have 
likely been a disastrous move due to the considerable military power the USSR still 
possessed.8 
5. Dissuasion  
Dissuasion seeks to influence states and non-state actors in directions positive to 
U.S. interests.  Dissuasion can be aimed at behavior (such as challenging the United 
States for sea-control) or capabilities (such as WMD programs or threatening 
conventional forces).  It is normally directed against future capabilities or behaviors—the 
goal is to persuade others that an alternative course is better than one that ends in 
threatening behaviors or capabilities.  While a deterrence strategy is intended for current 
threats, dissuasion seeks to influence the future security environment.  Dissuasion may 
occur alongside other strategies such as deterrence or coercion, but it also may use 
deterrence and coercion as part of an overall framework of dissuasion aimed at 
convincing the target to adopt a path acceptable to the United States.  An example of this 
                                                 
7 James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 159-213.   
8 Ibid.  
8 
is the effort to dissuade Libya from pursuing nuclear weapons, which used punitive 
strikes (coercion), and threats of massive retaliation (deterrence) as part of the overall 
dissuasive effort.                  
 
C. PUTTING DISSUASION IN CONTEXT 
This thesis explores how to operationalize a policy of dissuasion.  Outside of 
broad prescriptions, there are few published procedures for actually implementing the 
concept of dissuasion.  Indeed, the understanding of dissuasion as a defined strategy is in 
its infancy, even though it has been in actual routine use throughout history.  Today, U.S. 
strategists find themselves in a position analogous to the situation in 1945 with the then 
emerging strategy of deterrence.  In effect, we are “present at the creation.” From this 
perspective, it is easy to understand why the literature on dissuasion theory is quite 
limited.   
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of March 2005 emphasizes the importance 
of influencing events before they become threats.  According to the NDS, the first 
Strategic Objective is to secure the United States from direct attack by giving “top 
priority to dissuading, deterring and defeating those who seek to harm the United 
States…”  The NDS also states that, “We will work to dissuade potential adversaries 
from adopting threatening capabilities, methods and ambitions, particularly by 
developing our own key military advantages.”9  In contrast to conventional deterrence, 
dissuasion will be used in a proactive effort to persuade potential adversaries not to adopt 
threatening policies or build threatening capabilities in the first place.  Despite repeatedly 
invoking dissuasion as a strategy, however, the NDS is silent on how to implement the 
concept. 
Academic literature on dissuasion generally falls into one of three categories:  
Defining dissuasion, dissuasion campaigns aimed at specific targets, and the first 
tentative attempts to explain how dissuasion can be systematically implemented.  
                                                 
9 Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 
2005). 
9 
In the first category, author Richard Kugler discusses the complementary nature 
of dissuasion and deterrence in his article entitled “Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept.” 
He traces the roots of dissuasion to the Great Power politics of the nineteenth century, 
and its rebirth as a concept in the post-Cold War security environment.  Kugler sees the 
great value of dissuasion as a moderator on behavior: 
The main attraction of dissuasion is that while it is not always easy or 
inexpensive, it can inhibit otherwise tough-minded countries from going 
over the edge in their foreign policies and defense strategies.  It can help 
prevent them from not only competing with the United States militarily 
but also from menacing our allies, seeking to dismantle our collective 
security arrangements, and striving to impose new geopolitical 
arrangements that damage American interests and values.10 
Dissuasion relies on “stable, favorable force balances in key theaters,” according 
to Kugler.  Potential adversaries must be convinced that the cost of challenging the 
United States will far exceed any benefit.  This will require continuous strategic 
adjustment on the part of the United States, especially in light of the rapid nature of 
societal and military transformation overseas.  While Krugler’s analysis is valuable, it 
errs by assuming that dissuasion must be non-confrontational to be effective; to the 
contrary, the three case studies show that dissuasion can be actively aggressive, using the 
full spectrum of national power to meet policy objectives.           
M. Elaine Bunn discusses the unsettled nature of dissuasion as a tool of U.S. 
defense policy.11  Selecting a narrow definition of dissuasion as “discouraging military 
aspects of competition, or channeling threats in certain directions—rather than the 
broader interpretation of demotivating threatening ambitions in the first place,” she 
explores a variety of potential strategies, but cautions that a particular strategy used to 
dissuade one threat may promote the emergence of a different threat.  Bunn points to the 
U.S. advantage in research and development, engineering, and existing sophisticated and 
powerful military forces as compelling dissuasive tools—by imposing overwhelming 
costs on potential rivals, an insurmountable barrier to initial entry is erected.  Bunn also 
                                                 
10 Richard Kugler, “Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept,” Strategic Forum No. 196 (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University, 2002): 10. 
11 Elaine Bunn, “Force Posture and Dissuasion,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 3 (2004).  Available from,   
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive (accessed April 2006). 
10 
addresses the many unanswered questions with regard to dissuasion, such as:  How 
should dissuasion inform U.S. force capabilities decisions?  How best to leverage our 
R&D and engineering advantages for dissuading potential rivals?  Where in the U.S. 
government should dissuasion goals and policy be formulated? And finally, what affect 
will openly discussing dissuasion goals have on the “dissuadee?”  Other authors disagree 
with Bunn’s narrowing of dissuasion to exclude “demotivating threatening ambitions in 
the first place,” and the historical record demonstrates that dissuading undesirable 
aspirations is quite possible.          
In the second category, some literature narrows the discussion of dissuasion to 
specific adversaries (or potential adversaries) and categories of threat.  These scholars 
focus on WMD, terrorists/non-state actors, and various states such as Russia and 
Pakistan. Chuck Lutes and Scott Sagan address the role of dissuasion in preventing the 
spread and use of WMD.12   Sagan aligns the goals of dissuasion in the National Security 
Strategy with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but states that the logic underlying 
dissuasion is contrary to that of the NPT:  The NPT requires the United States to work in 
good faith toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, while dissuasion logically requires 
overwhelming nuclear superiority as a cost-prohibitive barrier to foreign nuclear 
competition with the United States.  He also points to the illogic in National Security 
documents which postulate that “rogue states” disregard deterrence in their drive to 
obtain WMD, but will somehow be persuaded by more subtle dissuasion. However, this 
view again consigns dissuasion into a too limited category of purely non-threatening 
strategies.  Lutes places dissuasion in the context of the three pillars of counter-WMD 
strategies (counter-proliferation, non-proliferation, and consequence management) by 
highlighting the role of passive and active defenses, focusing on barriers to entry and 
reducing the cost-benefit calculus of potential adversaries.   
                                                 
12 Scott Sagan, “Dissuasion and the NPT Regime: Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?” 
Strategic Insights, Vol. 3 (2004).  Available from, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive 
(accessed May 2006); and Chuck Lutes,  “The role of Dissuasion in Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 3 (2004).  Available from 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive  (accessed February 2006).  
11 
Joseph Pilat adds to the descriptions of the nature and functioning of dissuasion 
by identifying a dissuasion motive—negative consequences13  Pilat’s focuses not on 
dissuading terrorists from overall terrorist behavior, but on dissuading them from certain 
select actions, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction.  His techniques boil down 
to “draining the swamp” strategies of soft power, aggressive interdiction of materials and 
finished weapons, and (potentially coercive) influencing of sponsoring states and non-
state actors. 
Dissuasion of specific states is explored by Feroz Hassan Khan and Christopher 
Clary, John Gill, and James Goldgeier.14  Using Pakistan as an example, Khan and Clary 
highlight the difficulty of dissuading states more concerned with regional security issues 
than in cooperating with the United States.  The close Pakistani-U.S. relationship in the 
1950s and extensive economic and political pressure applied by Washington had little 
impact on Pakistani preoccupation with the Indian nuclear program.  Today, any effort at 
dissuading Pakistan will likely be overwhelmed by the urgency of fighting the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) and Pakistan’s continued rivalry with India.  Gill reinforces 
Khan and Clary’s general conclusion, but through a detailed examination of the history of 
U.S./Pakistan/India relations, he finds some modest successes for dissuasion.  He 
believes dissuasion is most likely to work when very senior personal diplomacy is used in 
a multi-nation framework.  Goldgeier draws lessons from the mixed success the United 
States has had in dissuading unwanted Soviet and Russian behaviors and capabilities 
since 1945.  His analysis of various episodes yields the following points:   
• With ideological foes, the best that one is likely to do is deterrence, rather 
than dissuasion.  
• Incentives must be larger than the benefits the targeted country is being 
asked to forego.  
                                                 
13 Joseph Pilat, “Dissuasion of Terrorists and Other Non-State Actors,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 3 
(2004). Available from, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive (accessed April 2006). 
14 Feroz Khan and Christopher Clary, “Dissuasion and Regional Allies: The Case of Pakistan,” 
Strategic Insights, Vol. 3 (2004).  Available from, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive 
(accessed April 2006); John Gill, “Dissuasion and Confrontation: U.S. Policy in India-Pakistan Crisis,” 
Strategic Insights, Vol. 3 (2004).  Available from, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive 
(accessed April 2006); and James Goldgeier, “Dissuasion in America’s Russian Policy,” Strategic Insights, 
Vol. 3 (2004). Available from http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive (accessed April 2006).  
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• Incentives must be satisfactory to powerful sub-state actors to be accepted 
by the state in question.  
• U.S. officials must be able to actually deliver the incentives promised. 
Goldgeier’s points about ideology and sub-state actors reinforce one of the main 
themes of this thesis: The strategic culture of the target state has a tremendous influence 
on the success or failure of dissuasion.       
In the final category—techniques for implementing dissuasion—Gregory Giles 
provides valuable insight by highlighting the difficulty of implementing dissuasion, but 
raises more questions than he answers. In addition to the questions previously raised by 
Bunn, Giles focuses on “What are the observables?” when evaluating dissuasion?  Giles 
also brings up the planning and organizational challenges inherent in dissuasion for 
combatant commanders with limited analytical resources, especially in reactive 
planning.15   
This survey of the existing literature demonstrates how tentative the security 
community’s grasp is on the dissuasion concept.  Scholars struggle to define the blurry 
line between dissuasion and deterrence, and seek out instances where dissuasion has been 
applied long before it was formally enunciated.  The focus on the efficacy of dissuasion 
as a non-threatening strategy completely misses that dissuasion is a framework for 
assembling a range of strategies—including aggressive coercion—to influence the target.  
The other glaring omission in the literature is the lack of methodology for applying 
dissuasion techniques to problems the United States will face in the future.  This thesis 
fills the gap in this literature.      
  
D. ROADMAP 
This thesis is moves dissuasion out the theoretical realm into the operational 
domain.  Chapter II suggests methods for planning and utilizing a dissuasion strategy to 
meet real world goals.  Common dissuasive tools are described (presence and 
engagement, controlling the spread of technology and arms, conditional support, 
                                                 
15 Gregory Giles, “Dissuasion: Conceptual, Planning, and Organizing Challenges for the U.S. 
Combatant Commands,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 3 (2004).  Available from, 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/index.asp#archive (accessed March 2006). 
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economic influence, and erecting barriers to effective competition), before a detailed 
discussion of the role of strategic culture is presented.  Chapter II closes with a 
description of the use of naval forces in executing a dissuasion policy and makes force 
structure recommendations. 
Chapter III through V present three historical case studies of dissuasion in the 
twentieth century: the United States effort to convince Libya to abandon pursuit of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); British attempts to dissuade Germany from 
building a rival battle fleet prior to World War I; and British operations in the Baltic in 
the period 1918–1921.  Each chapter presents a historical narrative, an analysis of how 
dissuasion was used, and an extraction of lessons learned. 
Chapter VI concludes this study by applying dissuasion to two current real-world 
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II. OPERATIONALZING DISSUASION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Dissuasion as a strategy was first formally proposed in the 2001 Quadrennial 
Defense Review.  This is not to say that dissuasion has not been used prior to being 
defined in 2001; quite to the contrary, dissuasion has been applied frequently in the 
twentieth century in attempts to influence geopolitical rivals.  The question of how 
dissuasion can be systematically implemented, however, has yet to be answered  
Dissuasion requires an ability to read what motivates the target.  Is the target 
motivated by ideology?  Economics?  Domestic politics, local security concerns, or fear 
of the United States?  In almost all cases, observable behavior is a complex mixture of 
reinforcing and opposing forces that, in the aggregate, produce a greater or lesser impetus 
to hew to a particular course.  After analyzing the target’s motives, appropriate dissuasive 
tools (presence and engagement, controlling the spread of technology and arms, 
conditional support, economic influence, and erecting barriers to effective competition) 
can be applied to dampen undesirable motivations and amplify those that tend to push 
behavior in a favorable direction. 
This chapter provides an outline of how the strategy of dissuasion can be put into 
practice by national policy makers and operational commanders.  First, a systematic 
approach to building a dissuasion strategy is developed, followed by an examination of 
the specific tools used to influence the target’s behavior.  Next, a detailed discussion of 
strategic culture is offered, emphasizing the absolute necessity of understanding the role 
it plays in the success or failure of dissuasion.  Finally, the specific role of naval forces in 
implementing dissuasion is examined, and force structure recommendations are offered.         
 
B. IMPLEMENTING DISSUASION   
A conceptual framework for implementing dissuasion involves applying specific 
pressures (tools) to motivations (which can be thought as vectors) acting on the target’s 
overall behavior.  The goal is to amplify motives that move observed behavior in the 
desired direction, and attenuate motives that move behavior in an undesirable direction.  
16 
The case study on Libya’s drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 
Chapter III, for example, demonstrates an intricate mixture of forces that either pushed 
the regime toward acquiring WMD or acted against that desire.  Figure 2 provides a 
highly simplified view of this phenomenon: 
 
 
Figure 2.   Simplified View of Motivations Driving Aggregate Behavior Toward 
Acquisition of WMD 
 
In the case of Libya, the United States used economic sanctions, diplomatic 
isolation, punitive strikes, interdiction, and engagement over three decades, eventually 
dissuading Tripoli away from its drive toward the acquisition of WMD.  Each action 
exerted specific pressures on one or more forces influencing Libya’s desire to develop 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.  Figure 3 provides a simplified view of how 
dissuasion changed Libya path: 
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Figure 3.   Nominal View of the Long Term Results of Dissuasion Polices on  the 
Aggregate Behavior Toward the Drive to Acquire WMD.    
 
Dissuading Libya used the entire spectrum of U.S. economic, military, and 
diplomatic power, illustrating the point that dissuasion uses other—often aggressive—
strategies such as coercion for reaching the overall dissuasive goal. When seeking to 
apply dissuasion to real-world problems, the Libyan example also highlights the 
importance of understanding the targets strategic culture, and brings out some of the tools 
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that may be used to effect change. Considering the above as a framework, it is possible to 
formulate a systematic approach to operatioanlizing dissuasion: 
• Define the behavior to be dissuaded and the desired behavior.  Is the 
desired behavior within the range limits dictated by the target’s strategic 
culture?  
• Identify the forces (vectors) pushing the target’s behavior toward and 
away from the undesirable behavior. 
• Select and apply tools for amplifying positive forces (vectors) and 
attenuating negative forces.   
• Continuously evaluate the effect dissuasion is having on the target. 
• Adjust to meet changing circumstances. 
 
The method described is no doubt overly mechanistic and simplistic, but it 
provides a mental framework for considering how dissuasion can be applied to real word 
problems.     
 
C. TOOLS FOR DISSUASION  
Methods of implementing a dissuasion policy include: Presence and engagement; 
controlling the spread of technology and arms; conditional promises of support and 
threats to withdraw support; building economic ties that promote influence; and erecting 
cost, technological, and ‘human capital’ barriers to effective competition.  Each of these 
methods is discussed, below: 
 
1. Presence and Engagement   
Presence and engagement operations, which signals U.S. resolve to potential 
enemies and provides reassurance to allies, are the cornerstones of any dissuasion policy.  
Military and diplomatic engagement builds state-to-state relationships, while the presence 
of U.S. forces in a region, especially if permanently stationed there, indicates 
unambiguously American commitment to stability, and a willingness to defend vital 
interests.  Allies draw reassurance, while potential foes must ponder the costs of 
challenging U.S. power.  Recent examples include the positive effects of U.S. tsunami 
and earthquake relief efforts in the Indonesia and Pakistan.  The favorable opinion of the 
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United States in Indonesia rose from an abysmal 15 percent in 2003 to 38 percent in 
2005, almost entirely due to American relief efforts following the December 2004 
tsunami.16  Following this improvement in the public view of the United States, 
Indonesia and the United States have begun to work on upgrading military-to-military 
contact and cooperation in the Global War on Terror, while civil relations between the 
two nations have also improved. 
If presence and engagement send strong signals about a regions importance, a 
lack of presence or an observable reduction in presence sends the exact opposite signal.  
As Chief of Naval Operation Admiral Mike Mullins said, “[V]irtual presence is actual 
absence.”17                          
 
2. Controlling the Spread of Technology and Arms   
A state may be dissuaded from pursuit of undesirable capabilities, such as 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), by active and passive measures to prevent 
acquisition of technology, components, and finished arms and equipment.  Arms control 
regimes, export controls, sanctions, interdiction, and blockade may all be used to meet 
policy goals. An example is the tight control of uranium enrichment technologies such as 
centrifuges, which may lead to a state to abandoning nuclear weapons development 
programs on the grounds that the end goal is unreachable.  As demonstrated by the North 
Korean development of nuclear weapons, however, attempts to prevent the spread of 
technology may only slow the development of undesirable capabilities unless other 
strategies such as positive incentives also are used. 
  
3. Conditional Support and Withdrawal of Support   
Moral, economic, or military support to a state can be granted upon condition of 
desired behavior, and existing support can be withdrawn on the same grounds.  Policy 
makers often offer tit-for-tat incentives to other states, seeking specific behaviors or 
modification of current behaviors in the targeted state.  For example, the United States 
                                                 
16 Pew Global Attitudes Project (June 2005).  Available from, 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247 (accessed January 2006).   
17 Admiral Mike Mullins, remarks at the National Defense University, Washington DC, 16 August 
2005.   http://www.navy.mil/palib/cno/speeches/mullen050816.txt, (accessed January 2006).  
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recently offered support for India’s nuclear program in exchange for placing the program 
under international controls and accepting deeper ties with Washington.   
  
4. Building Influence through Economic Ties   
Economic ties can provide dissuasive influence through direct pressure, such as 
embargo, or through the access to influential members of the target society.  Exerting 
influence through wielding the economic sword is a tried-and-true method of persuading 
a state to adopt favorable policies: Prior to the American Revolutionary War, for 
example, the British government was forced to abandon the Stamp Act when influential 
British merchants began to feel the pinch from an American boycott of British goods.  
Economic influence can reach coercive proportions, as in the recent Russian use of 
natural gas pricing to influence the Ukrainian government. Arms sales are another means 
of exerting pressure, and can have influence disproportionate to their actual monetary 
value by promoting military-to-military contact, parts supply and upgrade deals, and 
training exchange programs.            
 
5. Erecting Barriers to Effective Competition   
Erecting high barriers to competition may dissuade a potential adversary from 
even attempting the contest.  Barriers may take to form of an overwhelming lead in 
military force structure, a large technological lead, or an insurmountable lead in the area 
of “human capital.”  Due to American domination of high-intensity conventional war, 
most adversaries will likely opt to seek asymmetric alternatives to conventional battle or 
pursue WMD programs. Brad Roberts cautions however, that cost barriers “may be 
effective for de-motivating certain types of military response, but it may likewise 
motivate other responses, either asymmetric military ones or a general desire to compete 
in order not to be taken advantage of.”18 
The concept of a human capital barrier is often shortchanged in American 
strategic thought, which pays lip-service to the human factor in battle while banking on 
                                                 
18 Brad Roberts, “Dissuasion and China,” Strategic Insights Vol. 3 (2004).  Available from, 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/oct/robertsOct04.asp (accessed December 2005). 
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technology to win the day.19  U.S. military advantages often actually lie in areas such as 
the ability to project sustainable military power to the far side of the world, or the ability 
to keep up around-the-clock fixed-wing aircraft operations from the deck of an aircraft 
carrier.  These are human capabilities, not technological ones.  Fixed-wing carrier 
aviation, for example, involves human infrastructure that extends back to dozens of state-
side schools, elaborate training and evaluation programs, and procedures worked out over 
decades of operations.  Activities as challenging as this can not be easily replicated, 
despite the relatively low-tech nature of the overall endeavor—the Soviets worked for 30 
years to establish a competitive carrier strike capability, and never succeeded.  Much the 
same way as cost barriers can be established to prevent effective entry into the 
competition, human performance barriers also might be used to dissuade potential 
competitors from perusing certain paths.  These human capital barriers take two forms: 
they can be in the form of an insurmountable barrier, such as the carrier aviation 
example, or they can be in the form of a deliberate imposition of a human capital cost, by 
forcing competitors to use expensively trained personnel.  For instance, the Chinese are 
apparently working on using ballistic missiles to target ships at sea.  The traditional 
method of countering this would be to invest in high-technology kinetic weapons.  
Another route, one that erects a human capital barrier, would be to develop 
countermeasures that force the Chinese to put a highly trained man in-the-loop for 
terminal targeting of these ballistic missiles, thus erecting a barrier to development and 
deployment. 
 
D. DISSUASION AND STRATEGIC CULTURE 
Strategic Culture is the collective weight of national history, societal symbols, 
national “character,” government system, and founding myths within a society.  It acts to 
limit strategic choice and rank strategic preferences among decision makers, thus 
influencing the course of international affairs.  Understanding the role that strategic 
culture plays in limiting and ranking the options available to policymakers is vital to 
successfully implementing dissuasion.  
                                                 
19 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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1.  Introduction to Strategic Culture 
According to Alistair Johnston, strategic culture exerts its influence on society 
through consensus perceptions of the strategic environment and the efficacy of force:  
Strategic culture is an integrated “system of symbols”…which acts to 
establish pervasive and long-lasting preferences by formulating concepts 
on the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and 
by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the 
strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious… Thus 
strategic culture comprises two parts: the first consists of basic 
assumptions about the orderliness of the strategic environment, that is, 
about the role of war in human affairs (whether it is inevitable or an 
aberration), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses…and 
about the efficacy of the use of force… The second part consists of 
assumptions at a more operational level about what strategic options are 
the most efficacious for dealing with the threat environment.20  
Strategic preferences in a given society tend to be deeply rooted in historical 
experience, political customs, military culture, and geography.  Thus, preferences are 
ranked by strategic culture, while some options are completely eliminated. As an 
illustration of the power of strategic culture using the United States as an example, 
deterrence theorist Colin Gray has argued that the unique American historical experience 
produces “modes of thought and action with respect to force, [resulting in a set of] 
dominant national beliefs.”  America, Gray believes, tends toward messianic and 
crusading warfare, rooted in the moralism of the founding of the Republic that includes a 
rather unique belief that war is an aberration in human affairs.21      
Antulio Echevarria further describes the powerful effect strategic culture can have 
on strategic decision making, using what he terms the “American way of war” as an 
example.  The American way of war focuses on aggressive, direct, and decisive victory in 
battle—in essence, American thinking equates winning battles with winning the war, and 
that objectives are met exclusively through destruction of the enemy.  This thinking is 
endemic to American political-military culture due to the deeply ingrained tradition of 
military subordination to civilian authority that began with Washington’s Farewell 
Address: military professionals should concentrate on wining battles, while politicians 
                                                 
20 Alastair Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, (Spring 1995): 32.    
21 Gray quoted in Ibid., 36.   
23 
should focus on the diplomatic struggles that precede and follow war.  Americans view 
war as a violent alternative to politics and an aberration in human affairs—not a 
continuation of politics as Clausewitz believes.  This mental divide between peace and 
war has profound implications in how strategic decisions are made in Washington, 
perhaps most recently in the decisions about how to handle the invasion and occupation 
of Iraq.  Echevarria points out that American planning, following the strategic culture 
script, ended at the destruction of the old regime in Iraq, rather than concentrating on the 
strategic goal of establishing a new stable and democratic state.22 
If strategic culture is deeply rooted in history, do recent historical events have an 
impact?  To have any meaning at all, strategic culture must be fairly inelastic and 
immune to change, yet consideration must be made for seismic events like the Vietnam 
experience or 9/11.  In fact, cataclysmic events can have a significant impact on the 
strategic culture, but even in the midst of radical change culture tends to “stay with what 
it knows,” drawing on an alternative historical narrative to put new threats in perspective 
(as in the frequent comparison of the 9/11 attack with Pearl Harbor).  For example, the 
United States pursued an essentially internationalist policy in the Cold War, drawing on 
the experience of World War II that emphasized alliance partnerships and collective 
decision making.  John Lewis Gaddis writes, however, that the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the events of September 11, 2001, have brought to the fore older American 
traditions of unilateralism and preemption.23  Turning to another example, Johnston 
identifies two strands of Chinese strategic culture, which he labels “Parabellum (or 
realpolitik)” and “Confucian-Mencian.”  The Confucian-Mencian strand is currently 
inoperative and exists only as an “idealized discourse” in Chinese politics and strategy.24  
Taking into account the American experience above, perhaps a better way to view the 
Confucian-Mencian strand of strategic culture is as dormant rather than inoperative, 
simply waiting for the right conditions for it to resurface and gain prominence.  In short, 
                                                 
22 Antulio Echevarria, Toward an American Way of War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
March 2004).  
23 For an excellent discussion of the historical roots of current U.S. foreign policy, see John Lewis 
Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2004).  
24 Andrew Scobell, “Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory Versus the Fortune Cookie?” Strategic 
Insights, Vol. 4 (2005). Available from, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/scobellOct05.asp 
(accessed March 2006). 
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strategic culture can change quickly under the right circumstances, switching to an 
alternate (perhaps dormant) narrative, as is the case identified by Gaddis for American 
strategic culture.    
Other pressures act to change strategic culture over time (or act to restrain 
change).  These include domestic pressures (interest groups, competing ideologies, 
media, bureaucracy, etc.), international pressures (prevailing international regimes, 
emerging or receding threats, etc.), and technological change.  This last factor merits a 
little more explanation, due the controversial assessment of technology’s role in strategic 
culture literature.  Perhaps the best illustration of the role technology plays in strategic 
culture is to be found in the changes wrought by precision guided munitions (PGM) and 
computer networks on the American style of warfare, which emerged in the 1990s.  
Drawing on the terminology of complexity theory and air power, this new way 
emphasized speed, jointness, omniscient knowledge, and precision.  It promised quick 
results, few American casualties, and minimal collateral damage.  This “war on-the-
cheap” stepped away from the Vietnam-inspired Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force, 
making wars for less-than-vital interests far more acceptable to strategic decision makers 
than in the past, by promising low-cost victory.25  In the wake of 9/11, Americans seem 
willing to return to the more traditionally aggressive style of warfare—even if it means 
significant U.S. casualties—while the experience of urban fighting in the streets of Iraq is 
prompting a reevaluation of the air- and computer-centric approach to warfare. 
Capability—especially military capability—changes strategic culture in a 
feedback loop—if you have a hammer in your hand, all problems start to look like nails. 
Those with a powerful military are far more likely to select strategic options that include 
the use of force than states with no power-projection capability.  A fine example of how 
the military instrument can change strategic culture is offered by the American naval 
build-up of the late nineteenth century:  In the 1890s, the United States built a blue-water 
battleship navy for a variety of unfocused reasons, few of which had to do with actual 
national defense.  The nation—fired by a sense of Manifest Destiny—found itself with a 
new instrument of power, and began to look outward for a place to use it.  In April 1898, 
                                                 
25 Echevarria, 8-12.  
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America went to war with Spain over Cuban independence.  By August, the United States 
found itself in possession of an empire in the far Pacific and the Caribbean.  In the words 
of A.T. Mahan, the war  “…shattered national ideas deep rooted in the prepossessions of 
the century, and planted the United States in Asia, face to face with the great problems of 
the immediate future.”26                                  
Another element that shapes strategic culture is the role of “touchstone” events 
that achieve a unique prominence in strategic discourse and decision making.  Words or 
phrases such as “appeasement” or “Vietnam quagmire” are accorded an almost talisman-
like quality, evoking an entire framework of historical experience through which current 
events are viewed.  As Daniel Moran writes, “Appeasement…is the political equivalent 
of a swear word…whose lessons are so plain that only a fool could fail to heed them.”27  
Simply uttering the aphorism, “appeasement only leads to more aggression” acts to limit 
discourse by placing certain options out-of-bounds, thereby limiting strategic alternatives.  
Frequently, however, these touchstone events are invoked incorrectly.  Richard Neustadt 
and Ernest May illustrate this phenomenon perfectly when assessing the decision making 
around the Korean War.  President Truman correctly raised the specter of appeasement 
when making his decision to defend Korea in 1950, but later misapplied the lessons of 
Munich when considering if he should allow General Macarthur to continue pushing up 
the peninsula into North Korea.28  
The Korea example also illustrates another important point when considering the 
role of strategic culture in a crisis: who the decision makers are matters a great deal.  
Short term crisis-driven decision making may be held to a very select group of people 
that may or, may not, share in the collective biases of the larger society’s strategic 
culture.  In the case of the decision to defend Korea, the decision making group was 
really a group of one: President Truman, isolated far from Washington in his hometown 
of Independence, Missouri.  Longer term decisions, such as the decision to prosecute the 
                                                 
26 George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1996), 36.  
27 Daniel Moran, “Appeasement,” Strategic Insights Vol. 3 (2003).  Available from, 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/apr03/strategy.asp (accessed February 2006). 
28 Richard Neustradt and Richard May, Thinking In Time (NY: Free Press. 1988), 34-49.   
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Cold War embodied in the 1950 NSC-68 memorandum,29 are subject to a greater degree 
of strategic culture induced selectivity than those decisions made by small elites in a 
moment of crisis.                    
Strategic culture theory is a superstructure built upon a neorealist edifice—it 
assumes states will act in realist fashion to maximize advantage within the international 
system, with the caveat that perceived choices are limited and ranked by cultural bias.  
States can, however, have radically different goals for themselves, ranging from mere 
survival to hegemonic domination.  States perusing hegemonic domination will be more 
prone to select aggressive strategies than those who seek simple survival. 
To summarize, strategic culture is inherently resistant to change, but can change 
under the pressure from international events, technology, and domestic factors, often 
conforming to a previously dormant strategic tradition.  The twin factors of the operative 
strategic culture and strategic goals interact to rank and limit the strategic choices 
available to decision makers.  These preferences will tend to be pushed in aggressive 
directions if strategic goals are more ambitious than mere survival.  Figure 4 illustrates: 
 
                                                 
29 Michael Hogan, A Cross of Iron (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 265-76.  
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Figure 4.   Conceptual Diagram of Strategic Culture     
 
 
2. The Role of Strategic Culture in Dissuasion  
Given the role of strategic culture in limiting strategic choices, dissuasion must 
only attempt to push state behavior in a direction supported by the target’s strategic 
culture.  James Goldgeier believes that with ideological foes, the most that one is likely to 
accomplish is deterrence, rather than dissuasion, and that some states may simply refuse 
to be dissuaded.  Goldgeier points out that positive incentives offered to the Soviets had 
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little or no effect until Moscow gave up its ideological struggle with the West.30  The 
implication is that the strategic culture of the Soviets limited the potential range of 
strategic options open to consideration by the Soviet leadership.  American attempts at 
dissuasion that sought a reaction outside of that range were doomed to failure.      
Dissuasion must be continuously evaluated in situ.  A key component of strategic 
culture is military capability—changes in capability prompt changes in strategic culture.  
For example, the strategic culture of the United States changed considerably in the late 
nineteenth century when it acquired a ocean-going battle fleet, moving from an insular 
outlook to a more aggressive “imperial” outlook relatively quickly.  Thus, a dissuasion 
strategy formulated to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
for instance, will not work to subsequently persuade the target to give up its weapons 
once it has successfully acquired them: the strategic culture of the target state will be 
changed by new WMD capabilities, in turn changing the range of strategic choices 
available to the target state’s decision makers.31  Strategic culture is a light that must be 
cast continuously on the strategy of dissuasion if there is to be any hope of success. 
If strategic culture acts to limit policy options, then dissuasion policy must take 
into account the potential range of actions available to the target state, as perceived 
through the lens of target state’s strategic culture.  Any dissuasion strategy that seeks to 
force a state onto a path outside of this range will likely end in failure.  When considering 
the intersection of strategic culture and strategies such as dissuasion, deterrence, or 
coercion, it is useful to visualize each as opening up a different range of perceived 
available responses in the mind of the target.  One can readily see that dissuasion may 
encourage a different range of options in the mind of the target than a powerful military-
led coercion policy will open up.  This point is illustrated by Figure 2: 
 
 
                                                 
30 James Goldgeier “Dissuasion in America’s Russia Policy,” Strategic Insights Vol. 3 (2004).  
Available from, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/oct/goldgeierOct04.asp (accessed January 2006).  
31 For a discussion of the need to adjust dissuasion strategies to where exactly a state is in the WMD 
acquisition cycle, see Chuck Lutes, “The Role of Dissuasion in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,”  
Strategic Insights Vol. 3 (2004).  Available from, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/oct/lutesOct04.asp 
(accessed February 2006). 
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Figure 5.   Notional Target Response to the Application of Selected Strategies, 
 Dictated by the Target’s Strategic Culture 
 
 
 3. Summing Up the Role of Strategic Culture               
A dissuasion strategy must account for the strategic culture of the target.  Failure 
to take into account the likely response of the target, as dictated by strategic culture, 
dooms the operation from the start. The changing nature of the target’s strategic culture 
(in response to perceived threats, opportunities, increased capabilities, and other 
pressures) also must be continuously evaluated and measured against the likely response 
to the ongoing dissuasion operation. 
 
E. DISSUASION WITH NAVAL FORCES  
Naval forces are particularly suited to dissuasion: Presence and engagement 
operations are practiced by navies on a daily basis.  Controlling the spread of technology 
and arms through blockade and inspection regimes are also missions naval forces are 
familiar with.  Naval forces encourage economic ties through assuring freedom of the 
seas, and the complexity of naval arms further promote close ties when sold to other 
states.  Erecting technological and human capital barriers in the maritime arena can be as 
effective as anywhere else, especially given the enormous lead the U.S. Navy enjoys over 
any potential competitor (competing in submarine technology, for instance, can impose 
enormous costs on an adversary).  This section examines the specific role maritime forces 
can play in implementing the six dissuasion tools (presence and engagement, controlling 
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the spread of technology and arms, conditional support, economic influence, and barriers 
to competition), and the force structure that best supports dissuasion. 
 
1. Naval Forces and Dissuasive Tools  
Naval forces have an important role to play in implementing the various 
dissuasive tools.  A discussion of each of the five tools and the specific capabilities 
maritime forces bring to bear follows.    
 
a. Naval Forces in Presence and Engagement   
Naval forces routinely practice engagement through port visits, exchange 
of personnel, bi-lateral exercises, and security cooperation partnerships. They can also 
transition quickly to more direct strategies, such as coercion, and prepare the environment 
for follow-on joint forces.  The strategic mobility of naval forces provides a unique 
capability for implementing dissuasion, while being far less provoking than ground 
forces.  In an era when small disturbances can have an enormous impact on oil prices and 
seaborne trade, the presence of U.S. maritime forces in a region indicates American 
commitment to stability and a willingness to defend vital interests.  Presence dissuades 
illicit use of the “global commons” on the high seas for piracy, terrorism, and illegal 
trafficking in arms, weapons technology, and humans.  Naval presence applies deterrent 
pressure and provides a ready force to address problems before they harden into major 
crises. 
  
b. Naval Forces and Controlling the Spread of Technology and 
Arms   
A state may be dissuaded from pursuing certain avenues by limiting its 
access to technologies, particularly military technologies.  Methods include international 
treaty, embargo and sanctions, inspection regimes, and blockade.  Naval forces offer 
policy makers a spectrum of options for controlling the spread of technology and arms, 
from full maritime blockade to searching selected cargoes after intelligence cuing, such 
as the successful interdiction of uranium enrichment equipment bound for Libya under 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
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c. Using Naval Forces to Influence through Conditional Support 
and Withdrawal of Support   
Naval units may influence a state’s policies by provide direct military 
support upon agreed conditions, or threatened withdrawal of existing support if behavior 
does not change.  For example, the frequent demonstrations by U.S. Carrier Strike 
Groups (CSG) in the vicinity of the Taiwan Straights that deter China could also work to 
prevent a Taiwanese move toward independence if it was made known to Taipei that 
CSGs would be withdrawn if Taiwan “rocks the boat.”  The British Royal Navy played a 
prominent role in the formation of the Baltic States using multiple instances of 
conditional support and the threatened withdrawal of support to push behavior in desired 
directions.   
            
d.  Building Influence through Economic Ties   
Naval arms sales, due to the inherent complexity and enormous “sunk 
cost” nature of the product, offer potential influence through military-to-military contact, 
parts supply, upgrade deals, and training exchange programs.  Often, these relationships 
provide an avenue of entrée into foreign governments, allowing U.S. policy makers an 
opportunity to exert influence at multiple levels.  Additionally, the U.S. Navy is the 
global guaranteer of the freedom of the seas that underpins world trade, promoting the 
economic interdependence that gives the United States considerable influence overseas.                                 
 
e. Erecting Cost, Technological, and Human Capital Barriers with 
Naval Forces   
Erecting barriers to competition is an attempt to dissuade the adversary 
from even attempting the contest by presenting overwhelming superiority.  One area the 
U.S. enjoys enormous superiority in is the maritime domain—the U.S. Navy is larger 
than the next seventeen navies combined.32  Carefully maintenance of this overwhelming 
naval edge will likely dissuade any potential rival from undertaking a naval building  
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program designed to challenge the United States on the high seas (although a state may 
be tempted to seek local superiority through development of denial systems such as 
mines and coastal submarines).      
 
2. Naval Force Structures to Support Dissuasion 
A navy optimized to support the dissuasion tools outlined above must be flexible 
and scalable, without sacrificing the ability to fight a war at sea.  Analyzing the role 
maritime forces play in each of the dissuasive tools leads one to the conclusion that the 
Navy should seek a mutually supporting high/medium/low mix of forces. 
Engagement and presence require a broad spectrum of forces. At the high end, 
powerful battle-force ships—such as big-deck aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, 
strike-capable large surface combatants, and amphibious ships—are needed to influence 
events ashore and transition to full combat operations, if needed.  At the far end of the 
spectrum, riverine forces, construction battalions, and civil affairs teams, capable of 
operating far inland are required.  In the middle ground between these two sets of forces, 
however, a significant gap exists in the existing forces structure of the Navy.  Large blue 
water units are often simply too big and complex to operate effectively with small navies 
grappling with local security concerns such as piracy and counterterrorism, nor are 
expensive combatants available in sufficient numbers to maintain an adequate presence at 
all but the most important of hot spots.  There are many areas of the world—such as the 
Gulf of Guinea, where Nigerian oil is pumped and on-loaded for transshipment or 
Indonesian waters, through which pass 30 percent of the world’s trade—where dissuasion 
can best be supported by a continuous presence of smaller naval units suited to 
interoperating with local forces.  Ships capable of filling the “medium” role in a 
high/medium/low mix should be physically robust, capable of self-deploying to austere 
ports for extended periods of time, and relatively inexpensive.  A Patrol Corvette to fill 
this need could be based on a trawler design, or perhaps on one of the Atlantic fishery 
patrol vessels, such as the Royal Navy’s $50 million River-class, 1,800-ton, Offshore 
Patrol Vessel (OPV), capable of transiting 5,500 nm with an embarked helicopter.33 
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A high/medium/low mix of forces also supports the other tools of dissuasion (and 
other strategies):  Low and medium mix forces are well suited to controlling the spread of 
threatening arms and technology through inspection, interdiction, and surveillance, while 
the high end of the mix can enforce blockade, if necessary.  All three levels can be used 
in various scenarios of conditional support, and the medium and upper end of the ship 
mix promote economic influence if sold or deeded to foreign navies.  The upper end of 
the mix—nuclear aircraft carriers, submarines, and large surface warships—contribute 
uniquely to the overwhelming U.S. lead in conventional combat power: maintaining this 
barrier to competition must be our first priority.                                        
Naval forces should be considered the instrument of choice for operationalizing 
dissuasion due to their flexibility, strategic mobility, and the ability to exert the right 
pressure at the right place and time.  Each of the case studies that follow in Chapters III 
through V demonstrates the use of naval forces in dissuasion.        
 
F. CONCLUSION  
Operationalizing dissuasion requires analyzing the strategic culture and other 
factors influencing target behavior, then tailoring specific policies to exert pressure on the  
those factors.  Naval forces offer policy makers particularly effective means of 
implementing the tools of dissuasion.       
A final thought must be given to the total effect of dissuasion.  The actions of the 
United States—and in particular the actions of the U.S. military—are intensively 
scrutinized by friend and foe around the world.  Careful consideration of the 
consequences of a dissuasion strategy beyond the target is required.  M. Elaine Bunn 
provides a concrete example in “Force Posture and Dissuasion:”   
Country X may look at U.S. willingness to go into Iraq (when the U.S. 
Government believed Iraq had chemical weapons) and conclude that the 
cost of starting down or continuing down the path of WMD acquisition is 
just too risky and not worth it.  Some argue this is what happened in the 
case of Libya (though there is debate about Qadaffi’s motives and we may 
never know for sure how much the war in Iraq factored into this).  On the 
other hand, country Y or Z may look at the same Iraq situation, and 
conclude that the only way to protect itself against being “Saddam-ized” is 
to acquire WMD.  Some say this is precisely or partly what is motivating 
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North Korea, which may have been reinforced by Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in its determination to acquire nuclear weapons for regime 
survival.  Iran is also showing every sign of being determined to go 
forward, rather than being dissuaded.34    
The techniques outlined in this chapter—along with traditional strategies such as 
deterrence and coercion—can by used by policy makers to change the behavior of groups 
and states if intelligently and consistently applied.  The three case studies that follow will 
show how other states have attempted to incorporate dissuasion into their foreign policy 
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III. DISSUADING CAPABILITIES CASE STUDY: LIBYAN 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
In December 2003, Libya announced to the world that it would dismantle its 
nuclear and chemical weapons programs and immediately allow international weapons 
inspectors into the country.  Seeking to end almost three decades of political and 
economic isolation, Libya pledged to eliminate all nuclear and chemical weapons 
programs, submit to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, do away 
with all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 300 kilometers and payloads of greater 
than 500 kilograms, and to destroy all existing chemical weapons stocks.35  Several 
months earlier, in August of 2003, Libya had formally accepted “responsibility for the 
actions of its officials” in the bombing of Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerby, Scotland.  
It agreed to compensate the families of the victims with some $10 million each, and 
handed over two indicted suspects (Libyan intelligence agents Adb al-Basset Ali al-
Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifah Fhalifh) for trial at The Hague.  Libya also agreed to pay 
$170 million to the families of the UTA Flight 772 bombing over Niger in 1989, after a 
French court convicted six Libyans for complicity in the airliner’s destruction.36   
In addition to the decommissioning of Libya’s WMD programs, the events of 
2003 marked the completion of Libya’s movement away from support of terrorist 
organizations, which began in the late-1990s with the closing of the notorious desert 
training camps that had hosted such organizations as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  Libya’s sincerity had been reinforced 
in the minds of western leaders when Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi roundly 
condemned the 9/11 attacks and quietly began providing intelligence to the United States 
and cooperating with counter-terrorism efforts.37     
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What prompted Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi to give up his long pursuit of 
WMD and support for international terrorism?  Although the term “dissuasion” was not 
formally identified as a strategy until 2001, the three-decade long U.S. diplomatic, 
economic, and military effort aimed at persuading Libya to abandon state-sponsored 
terrorism and pursuit of WMD is a clear example of dissuasion in operation.  Since the 
Reagan administration in the early 1980s, the United States has used tools such as 
technology embargoes, international sanctions, interdiction of weapons components, 
punitive attacks, and finally, engagement and incentives, to dissuade Libya from support 
of international terrorism and WMD.  In 2003, Washington’s long-term strategy paid off 
when Libya renounced its WMD program.  This case study examines the thirty year 
struggle between Washington and Tripoli as a means of illuminating the larger question 
of how to operationalize dissuasion strategies elsewhere.       
How did dissuasion achieve U.S. goals in the Libyan case? What did, and did not, 
work?  What lessons can be applied to other situations faced by the United States, and 
which lessons are unique to the Libyan case?  This chapter examines the sometimes 
inadvertent dissuasion strategy used against Libya, revealing that successful dissuasion 
requires the broadest possible application of combined diplomatic, economic, and 
military power.  Other important insights include how counter-productive harsh rhetoric 
such as calls for “regime change” can be, the importance of engagement to build trust, 
and the necessity of understanding the strategic culture of the state in question.  First, the 
history of Libyan-U.S. relations is examined, followed by an analysis of the effectiveness 
of dissuasion strategies as applied to Libya, and finally, a summary of lessons learned 
from this case study is offered.       
 
B.  BACKGROUND: LIBYA’S TROUBLED HISTORY OF TERRORISM 
SUPPORT AND PURSUIT OF WMD 
As with so many other issues in the twenty-first century, the roots of Libyan-
American conflict lie in the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  Initially, the United States did not oppose the 1969 coup led by Captain 
Muammar Al Qadhafi against the Libyan monarchy, since the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC) presented itself as anti-Soviet—although ideologically pan-Arab and 
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socialist.  This attitude began to change when the United States and Britain were forced 
to withdraw from their Libyan bases in 1970 (Wheelus Air Force Base was intended to 
support strategic strikes on the Soviet Union).  Concern solidified into active opposition 
when Libya began to court the Soviet Union and ferment anti-western revolutions in 
North Africa and the Middle East in the early 1970s.38 
Libya, driven by the ideological fervor of Muammar Qadhafi, began promoting in 
the third world a political and economic alternative to both the capitalist West and the 
communist Soviet Union.  Qadhafi believed that the third world should seek a path 
between Western liberal capitalism and communism, known as the “Third International 
Theory,” published in his three-volume Green Book.  He also strongly opposed Israel and 
sought to position Libya as the leader of pan-Arabism.  In order to gain influence with 
Arab states and oppose Western influence in the third world, Libya supported a wide 
variety of violent organizations (including the Red Army Faction, the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine, and the Irish Republican Army) and was involved in rebel 
movements across Africa and the Middle East.39  Qadhafi’s ideological belief in 
independence for the third world and his enmity for the West became the heart of Libya’s 
strategic culture.  U.S. options for reconciliation by the mid-1970s were limited indeed.    
By the end of the 1970s, Libya’s activities and ideological outlook hardened 
American opposition, which in turn pushed Libya increasingly into the Soviet orbit, 
further straining relations between Washington and Tripoli (although America continued 
to purchase oil well into the early 1980s).40  Relations between Libya and the United 
States deteriorated to the point of rupture when the Reagan Administration became 
convinced that a series of terrorist attacks against American targets overseas were at the 
behest of Libyan agents or proxies—including the bombing of a west Berlin disco in 
1986 that killed two U.S. servicemen and wounded 229 others.   In 1986, Presidential 
Executive Orders 12543 and 12544 imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions on 
Libya, which were followed up by coercive air strikes against terrorism related targets in 
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Benghazi and Tripoli.  The air strikes and other coercive actions—including aggressive 
operations by carrier battle groups in the Gulf of Sidra that resulted in several 
confrontations with Libyan aircraft—by themselves clearly failed to modify Libyan 
behavior: Libyan agents were complicit in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 
and UTA-772 over the Sahara in 1989.  Equally as clear, the sanctions imposed by the 
Regan administration failed to immediately dissuade Libya from pursuit of chemical and 
nuclear weapons, which included the development of a hardened underground chemical 
munitions complex at Tarhura.41     
The isolation of Libya increased in 1991 when Libya lost its great power sponsor 
in the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Absent the threat of a Soviet veto, the international 
community adopted UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 748, which imposed 
economic sanctions in response to Libyan resistance to the Pan Am-103 and UTA-772 
investigations.  In 1993, the Clinton administration successfully sponsored UNSCR-883, 
which further tightened sanctions.  Unilaterally, the United States passed the Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act (ILSA), which sought to limit financial flows into Libya and Iran by 
imposing sanctions on any international company operating in the United States that 
invested in Iran or Libya, and expanded the target of sanctions to include Libyan WMD 
activities.  Collectively, these U.S. and international sanctions regimes began to seriously 
affect the Libyan economy.  Although the UN never imposed an oil embargo on Libya, it 
did ban the sale of any new oil production equipment (which in any event was based on 
American technology that been unavailable to Libya since the early 1980s).  While other 
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declined.42  Libya’s long term economic distress caused by wide-ranging international 
sanctions would eventually become an important factor in the ultimate success of U.S. 
strategy.43           
While the sanctions regimes of the 1990s apparently only had limited success 
modifying Libya’s immediate behavior with regard to support of terrorism (Libya did 
close their terrorist training camps in the late 90s, but refused to cooperate with the 
ongoing Pan Am-103 trial and investigation), it had little no effect dissuading Qadhafi 
from pursuing a nuclear weapons program.  Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Kahn’s illicit 
weapons trafficking network began negotiations to provide uranium enrichment 
equipment to Libya in 1997.  In the waning months of that year, Libya acquired twenty 
“P-1” type centrifuges, and parts for the construction of another 200.  Kahn also provided 
the designs for a nuclear warhead, reportedly based on the Chinese weapon from the 
1960s.44  In 2001 and 2002 Kahn delivered more centrifuges and uranium hexafluoride (a 
material needed to process highly enriched uranium) directly to Libya on Pakistani cargo 
planes.45  Libya also maintained a significant ballistic missile arsenal, comprised of 
Soviet supplied 300-km range Scud Bs, and 600-km Scud Cs acquired from North Korea. 
Tripoli was also developing a 700-km missile called the Al Fatah, which suffered 
developmental problems due to international sanctions choking off supplies and technical 
knowledge.46                                                            
While Libya continued work on its nuclear program, the Clinton administration 
began a slow shift towards a strategy of limited engagement with Libya.  In exchange for 
handing over the two suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing, in 1998 the United States 
agreed to move the trial to a neutral country (the Netherlands) and began to ease 
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sanctions.  The suspect handover, coupled with the closing of the desert terrorist training 
camps, gave the Clinton administration enough confidence in Libya’s change of heart to 
refrain from objecting when the UN lifted sanctions.47  These early steps toward 
engagement began to build a limited trust between Tripoli, and the British and American 
Governments.        
The slow rapprochement between Libya and Washington gained a new urgency in 
the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Qadhafi, who publicly denounced the attacks, 
found common cause with America—he too was highly concerned with fundamentalist 
Islamists, fermenting rebellion in his own state.  Libyan intelligence officers approached 
U.S. officials with an offer to share intelligence and cooperate on counterterrorism 
efforts, further building trust between the two nations based on the need to deal with a 
common problem.      
In March of 2003 the British government informed Washington of an electrifying 
new development.  The head of Libyan intelligence, Musa Kusa, had approached British 
MI6 with an offer from Qadhafi to give up their WMD programs and long-range ballistic 
missiles in exchange for a normalization of relations.48  In October, a merchant ship, the 
BBC China, was interdicted under the new Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in the 
Italian port of Taranto with centrifuge parts bound for Libya.  Remarkably, the seizure of 
the nuclear enrichment components coincided with inspections of nuclear and chemical 
facilities in Libya by U.S. and British officials.  During the negotiations leading up to the 
acceptance of inspections, American officials left the Libyan’s in no doubt about the 
depth and breadth of U.S. intelligence’s knowledge of Libya’s WMD programs.  In the 
words of CIA Director George Tenet: 
The leverage was intelligence.  Our picture of Libya’s WMD programs 
allowed CIA officers…to press the Libyans on the right questions, to 
expose inconsistencies, and to convince them that holding back was 
counterproductive.49 
                                                 
47 Calabrese. 
48Gertz.  
49 George Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in Changing Global Context,” testimony 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 March 2004.   
41 
The revelations of the strength of U.S. knowledge about Libyan weapons 
programs and the interdiction of the uranium processing equipment on BBC China were 
important elements in Tripoli’s decision to completely abandon WMD.  Subsequently, 
Qadhafi broadcast on state television a decision to give up all nuclear and chemical 
weapons, prompting President Bush to issue an executive order in September 2004 
ending most U.S. sanctions against Libya.50  Years of sanctions, conditional engagement, 
conditional incentives, and mutual interests led Libya back into the fold of nations. 
Until 2006, Libya still remained officially on the United States government’s list 
of states that sponsor terrorism—the State Department’s assessment of 2005 reported 
“outstanding questions over residual contacts with past terrorist clients,” and Libyan 
implication in plots to destabilize Saudi Arabia.  Saudi Arabia and Libya officially 
announced the resolution of any disputes in September of 2005.51   On 15 May 2006, 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that Libya was to be officially removed 
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and that normal diplomatic relations with 
Tripoli would be resumed, citing, “historic decisions taken by Libya's leadership in 2003 
to renounce terrorism and to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programs.”52  American oil companies are now working with Libya to upgrade its aging 
oil processing infrastructure, a United States liaison office has been opened in Tripoli, 
and President Bush has issued two waivers of the Arms Export Control Act allowing 
American companies to compete for contracts to destroy Libyan chemical weapons and 
refurbish military transport aircraft.53 
Having provided a historical sketch of United States-Libya relations over the last 
half-century, an analysis of the successful dissuasion of Libya’s WMD programs is 
provided below.     
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C.  ANALYSIS: DISSUASION AND LIBYA 
The turning away of Libya from state-sponsored terrorism and pursuit of weapons 
of mass destruction provides perhaps the best examples of the successful application of 
dissuasion in U.S. diplomatic history.  It demonstrates that state behavior can be changed, 
and the drive to acquire WMD capabilities can be stopped.  But why, exactly, did Libya 
change course?  The United States used coercion, economic and political sanctions, 
public exposure of Libyan WMD programs, and active interdiction of production 
equipment, all of which played a role.54     
An alternative explanation may be found in a form of “extended coercion:” 
United States Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith proclaimed that the lesson of 
U.S. military power projection in Afghanistan and Iraq caused Libya’s change of heart.55  
While the display of American power and resolve no doubt was sobering to Colonel 
Qadhafi, this explanation ignores the continued resistance of Iran and North Korea when 
confronted with the same lesson in American power, and years of Libyan resistance to 
U.S. active coercion.   
Christopher Boucek, editor of the Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor in 
London, believes Tripoli was continuing to move ahead with its long-standing desire to 
reenter the community of nations: 
For Libya, positive relations with the United States not only equate to 
much needed American financial and technological investment; almost as 
importantly they translate into the imprimatur of acceptance into the 
international community after years in the diplomatic wilderness.  Most 
significantly, an end to the U.S. sanctions would allow Libya to seek badly 
needed access to international financial organizations.56  
Long-term American and, just as importantly, international sanctions certainly 
played a role in dissuading Libya.  Sanctions and interdiction efforts significantly 
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complicated Libyan efforts to acquire WMD production equipment and know-how, and 
there is no doubt that economic sanctions put tremendous strain on the Libyan economy.  
But these pressures alone—even when coupled with punitive military strikes—did not 
have the desired effect until it became clear that the benefits of avoiding American 
enmity outweighed the costs of continuing on course.  The accommodation offered by the 
Clinton administration in the late 1990s—a classic “carrot and sticks” strategy—gave the 
initial impetus to seek a return to the fold.  Sanctions and punitive measures can set the 
stage for successful dissuasion, but, as can be seen in the Libyan case, engagement and 
incentives geared to expectations for a change of behavior were also required.  Attention 
must also be paid to timing—economic sanctions needed years to put adequate pressure 
on Libya’s government, and the early revolutionary strategic culture had to mellow 
before any change of course could be contemplated.            
Perhaps most importantly, the United States was only seeking a change in 
behavior and an abandonment of WMD development, not regime change.  United States 
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton’s rhetorical expansion of the “Axis 
of Evil” to include Libya—with its underlying theme of regime change—brought 
negotiations with Libya to a halt.  Alexander Montgomery has described the effect 
regime change rhetoric had on Libya: 
This uncompromising rhetoric [of regime change] limits U.S. policy 
options and places the United States in a difficult negotiating position.  
The United States and the United Kingdom could not reach an agreement 
with Libya until the Bush administration complied with a request by high-
level British officials to remove Bolton from the U.S. negotiation team; 
Bolton’s unwillingness to compromise was preventing Libya from 
accepting a deal.57     
Clearly, words matter, and they especially matter if the words call for regime 
change.   
Neither coercion nor unilateral sanctions alone were sufficient to modify the 
behavior of Libya.  Ultimately, the full application of U.S. power combined with robust 
international support—targeted at limited and achievable policy goals—enabled by the 
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trust built through engagement, met with success in dissuading Libya from pursuit of 
WMD and support for international terrorism.  These lessons are illustrated further 
below.          
 
D. LESSONS   
The key question raised by this case study is how did dissuasion achieve U.S. 
goals in the Libyan case? What lessons can be applied to other situations faced by the 
United States, and which lessons are unique to the Libyan case?   
 
 1. Coercion Alone May Not Work to Achieve Policy Goals   
A coercion strategy that does not integrate other strategies will rarely achieve 
policy goals. The coercive air raids on Libya in 1986 and aggressive operations by the 
United States Navy in the Gulf of Sidra had little direct effect on the acquisition activities 
and behavior of Libya.  Indeed, Libyan terrorist attacks abroad increased in their severity, 
and the air raids may have accelerated Libyan plans to procure WMD as a means of 
countering the overwhelming conventional military superiority of the West.  The rapid 
destruction of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the removal of Sadaam Hussain from 
power in Iraq may have served as a sort of “extended coercion” lesson to leaders such as 
Qadhafi, as some American officials claim, but the continued intransigence of Iran and 
North Korea demonstrate the limited nature of that effect.  More than just fear of U.S. 
military action is required to change behavior.    
                
2. Engagement is Required to Build Trust on Both Sides   
Engagement provides a vehicle for accommodation by building some measure of 
trust among contending parties.  The breakthrough that resulted in Libya abandoning its 
WMD development programs and sponsorship of terrorism was based on the trust built 
up on both sides over the last decade.  The Clinton administration’s acceptance of Libyan 
pleas to move the Pan Am bombing trial to neutral ground, in exchange for the 
extradition of the suspects, set the stage for the incremental trust building that followed.  
British sponsorship of lifting international sanctions in the UN built trust to the point 
where Libya felt bold enough to approach the British with an offer to abandon WMD 
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programs in exchange for the removal of the remaining U.S. sanctions—a move the 
United States agreed to, based on the trust engendered from intelligence help it had 
received from Libya following the 9/11 attacks.  Collectively, this trust building 
engagement ultimately cleared the way for full reintegration of Libya into the 
international community as a responsible nation.       
         
3. A Combination of Carrots and Sticks Seems to Motivate Good 
Behavior Best 
Tangible incentives and penalties, as a package, provide the best incentive for 
moving state behavior in the desired direction.  The long-term strategy employed against 
Libya—which included robust sanctions, interdiction of weapons materials, and coercive 
strikes—ultimately only proved successful when additional positive incentives were 
offered.  Granted, the virtual quarantine that the international community imposed on 
Libya set the stage by depressing Libya’s economy and dimming her future prospects, but 
resolution only came when the prospect of a return to the international fold, with its 
attendant economic advantages, was offered as part of the deal for the Pan Am Flight 103 
bombers.  The United States offered no direct positive incentives such as financial aid, 
only an agreement to cease active opposition, which would have its own rewards.  States, 
like humans, are often best motivated by the prospect of reward as well as punishment.              
   
4. Harsh Rhetoric, Especially if It Involves Demands for Regime 
Change, Limits Options for Both Parties   
Public and diplomatic rhetoric counts.  Public threats and uncompromising 
statements are frequently meant for domestic consumption, but policy makers should be 
aware of their often negative effect on achieving strategic goals.  An obvious difference 
between the rhetoric directed at Libya, and that showered on Iraq and North Korea, is the 
insistence on regime change in the latter two cases.  When Undersecretary John Bolton 
lumped Libya in with the “Axis of Evil” it virtually halted any progress on discussions 
between Libya and U.S.-U.K negotiators.  A regime confronted with the specter of 
forcible removal will be driven to almost any lengths to survive, whereas a state that can 
be sure of continuance will feel far freer to negotiate at the margins for mutual advantage.      
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5. Common Problems Can Lead to Ultimate Solutions  
Addressing collective or bi-lateral problems provides an opportunity for 
engagement and trust building.  Qadhafi’s fear of an Islamic uprising in Libya dovetailed 
nicely with the United States Global War on Terrorism.  In many ways, the United States 
and Libya share the same enemies and interests.  The post 9/11 environment led to 
recognition of this by both Libyan and American intelligence, prompting a sharing of 
information on Islamic terrorist activities, eventually pointing the way towards a 
compromise that would be beneficial to both nations: the renouncement of Libya’s WMD 
programs and her reintegration into the international community.  Policy makers would 
be well advised to search for common ground with opponents—perhaps based on 
common problems—to begin a useful dialog.      
          
6. Sanctions Require International Support to be Effective  
Unilateral sanctions will rarely work to modify behavior when the target can 
bypass the sanctions, going elsewhere to meet domestic needs.  The near complete 
diplomatic and economic isolation of Libya had perhaps the greatest effect on her 
behavior.  In contrast, unilateral sanctions, such as those imposed by the United States on 
Cuba for many decades, have a history of very limited success.  In order to dissuade 
capabilities building and poor behavior, sanctions must universally applied and 
rigorously enforced.     
 
7. Intransigent States with Great Power Sponsors May Feel Themselves 
Immune to Pressure  
States that have support from one great power will likely defy pressure from 
another great power.  Empirically, Libya’s behavior began to change in the 1990’s when 
it lost her great power sponsor in the Soviet Union.  This not only increased Libya’s 
isolation, it removed the ultimate backstop for continued defiance.  It will be difficult to 
successfully direct a dissuasion strategy at a state like North Korea, which has at least the 
tacit support of China, pointing to the need to sometimes direct dissuasion at second 




8. Strategic Culture and Ideology in the Target State Matter   
Strategies that attempt to move behavior outside of the range dictated by the 
target state’s strategic culture will be unlikely to succeed.  Strategic culture is notoriously 
difficult to assess, but the Libyan case demonstrates how the power of Qadhafi’s ideology 
and the “Third Universal Theory” espoused in his Green Book narrowed the choices the 
Libyan leadership was willing to even contemplate.  It can be surmised that the hold of 
ideology grew weaker as Qadhafi mellowed with age and the Third Universal Theory 
became obviously untenable, opening up more strategic options for Libya.  Regardless of 
the specific case of Libya, it remains true that ideology and strategic culture powerfully 
limit the options available to governing elites, and thus limit the possible range of 
effective dissuasion strategies that can be successfully employed against a target state. 
These are the lessons that can be drawn from the three decades of dissuasion 
strategies applied to the Libyan state, consistently and carefully applied over the course 
of four United States administrations.                       
  
E. CONCLUSION 
The Libyan example demonstrates that a long-term strategy of dissuasion can 
indeed change the course of state behavior, and can indeed dissuade state officials from 
attempting to build weapons of mass destruction. Each situation is unique, however, and 
universal lessons concerning the application of dissuasion should be applied carefully: 
North Korea, for example, has a great power sponsor in China, which fundamentally 
changes the dynamic of a dissuasion policy of isolation.  Still, the Libyan case suggests 
that dissuasion can generate positive results, especially if it can be applied with 
persistence and patience.     
Simple negative “sticks” must be accompanied by appropriate “carrots” for the 
strategy to be truly effective. U.S. and international economic sanctions, diplomatic 
isolation, punitive strikes, and interdiction all played prominent rolls in this story, but so 
too did a carefully crafted re-engagement strategy that avoided rhetorical insistence on 
regime change.   
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The example of Libya provides a template for dissuasion strategies against 
“rogue” states: internationally legitimate sanctions with rigorous enforcement, 
interdiction of weapons components, clear understanding of the limits imposed by 
strategic culture, and conditional engagement can modify behavior and capabilities-
building over the long-term.  
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IV. DISSUADING BEHAVIOR CASE STUDY: BRITISH 
OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC, 1918–1921 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In the years immediately following the Great War, Britain midwifed the birth of 
the Baltic States, using coercion, deterrence, and dissuasion strategies to fend off German 
and Soviet intrusions, and to keep White Russian armies at bay.  Britain’s strategic goals 
were to establish a buffer between Germany and Russia, prevent the spread of 
communism into Central Europe, support White Russian forces in the Russian civil war, 
and to open up Baltic markets to British goods.  Dissuasion strategies played a key role in 
British Baltic operations during this period.                  
In late 1918, in the closing months of the First World War, the Russian Baltic 
Provinces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania moved toward independence, grasping at an 
opportunity brought about by the abdication of Czar Nicholas and the defeat of the 
Russian Army.  When the Armistice ending the Great War went into effect on 11 
November 1918, victorious Great Britain faced a changed world.  Its relative power in the 
world had declined considerably, its economy was poorly situated to compete in world 
markets, and the nation was under severe financial strain brought on by four years of all-
out war effort.  Britain also found itself with an enormous navy honed to razor sharp 
efficiency by four years of conflict—an over-abundance of military capacity looking for a 
mission.  Britain wished to restore the balance of power to Europe—fearing an alliance 
between Germany and Russia—and sensed that the Baltic States and Poland might serve 
as buffers to keep the two separated.  All Allied politicians also feared the spread of 
Bolshevism from Russia to Central and Western Europe, a disease seemingly ripe for 
incubation in their own disillusioned populations.  Britain also wished to open up any 
available economic markets to British goods, with a view to repaying its enormous war 
debt and regaining her preeminent position. 
With these goals in mind, the British government sent a squadron of light cruisers 
and destroyers to the Baltic in the winter of 1918, charged with continuing the blockade 
of Germany and establishing relations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  Over the next 
two years the naval force in the Baltic helped beat back the Bolshevik armies, prevented 
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the takeover of the Baltic provinces by German and White Russian armies, reestablished 
trade, and generally nursed the new Baltic States to life.  These feats were accomplished 
without landing any major ground forces—Royal Navy units under the command of 
Admirals Sinclair and Cowan were the instruments of choice.  The Navy and the British 
Foreign Office deftly used a combination dissuasion, deterrence, and coercion to meet 
national goals, effectively employing economic, political, and military instruments of 
power amidst a highly fluid and confusing environment.   
This chapter examines the two years of British involvement in the Baltic that 
began at the close of World War I.  The use of dissuasion and persuasion techniques are 
highlighted throughout the narrative.  Following a discussion of the historical events, an 
analysis is offered, and lessons learned from the British Baltic episode will also be 
presented.    
 
B. BACKGROUND: THE BRITISH IN THE BALTIC  
The British squadron ordered into the Baltic faced an incredibly confused and 
complex geo-political and military situation.  The shaky states of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania were beset on all sides by enemies and internal strife.  The situation was, in the 
words of James Cable, “pregnant with formless menace [and] offering obscure 
opportunities.”58  At the close of World War I, the British simply wished to begin dealing 
with the myriad problems presented in the Baltic.  Later, policy shifted to the primary 
goal of defending the sovereignty of the new Baltic States, often using dissuasion as the 
tool of choice.  
 
1. The Close of the Great War 
The cruise journal of HMS Delhi gives an idea of the chaotic conditions that 
existed in the Baltic in 1918: “Now the days following the Great Peace were troublous 
days.  There were wars and rumors of wars, famines and pestilences...  Of all lands, no 
land was more distressed than the Land of Rus.”59  In March of 1918, the Brest-Litovsk 
peace treaty negotiations between Germany and the Bolshevik government of Russia had 
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been greatly complicated by moves towards independence in the former Russian 
provinces of the Baltic.  Leon Trotsky resisted the German demands for the Baltic 
provinces to be allowed to secede, but a renewed German offensive in the east forced him 
to accept the German terms. The allies, fearing the weight of newly released Eastern 
Front troops in the West, sent troops and ships to Murmansk in an effort to tie up German 
forces and prevent large amounts of allied war-stocks from falling into German hands, 
thus beginning British involvement in Russian and Baltic affairs.60   
German armies continued to occupy Lithuania and Latvia at the close of the war.  
In February, Germany allowed Lithuania to proclaim independence on condition it sign a 
treaty of perpetual alliance.  Latvia and Estonia were to be controlled by a puppet 
Landesrat set up in Riga.  In Estonia, the ethnic Germans appealed to Berlin to drive out 
local Communists, who promptly fled to Russia.  Estonia declared its independence, 
remaining free for 24 hours until the German 8th Army occupied Riga on 25 February 
1918. 
Following the Armistice on 11 November, the situation in the Baltic grew even 
more confused.  Article XII of the Armistice specified “…the Germans were to withdraw 
from the territory that was formerly part of the Russian Empire as soon as the Allies 
should consider the moment suitable, having regard to interior conditions of those 
territories.”  This clause was designed to ensure the German Army prevented the spread 
of Bolshevism to the west.  In Estonia, however, the German Army mutinied, demanding 
to be immediately sent home.  Estonia at once declared independence a second time, on 
11 November 1918.  The Latvian and Estonian envoys in London anxiously made clear 
how precarious their position was—Bolshevik forces were threatening to intervene as 
soon as the German Army withdrew.  The first British response was formulated by 
Foreign Secretary Balfour:  
One result has been to modify the principle motive which prompted our 
expeditions to Murmansk, Archangel and Vladivostok.  So long as a life 
and death struggle was proceeding on the Western Front it was of the first 
importance to prevent the withdrawal of German forces from Russia to 
France; but with the conclusion of the German Armistice this motive has 
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no further force.  For what then are we maintaining troops in various parts 
of what was once the Russian Empire?  It seems commonly supposed that 
that those expeditions are partial and imperfect efforts to carry out a 
campaign against Bolshevism… This view indicates a complete 
misapprehension of what His Majesty’s Government is able, or desires to 
do…But it does not follow that we can disinterest ourselves wholly from 
Russian affairs… [N]ew anti-Bolshovist administrations have grown up 
under the shadow of Allied forces.  We are responsible for their existence 
and must endeavor to assist them.  For us no alternative is open at the 
present than to use such troops as we possess to the best advantage; where 
there are no troops, to supply arms and money; and in the case of the 
Baltic provinces, to protect, as far as we can, the nascent nationalities with 
our fleet.61 
Balfour’s formulation clearly included elements of dissuasion in the overall 
strategy:  The fleet would be used for support and coercion, and economic means would 
be used to influence the behavior of all players in the region.   
There was very limited tolerance for foreign interventions with troops in war-
weary Britain, and none for ground adventures in the Baltic region.  Nevertheless, the 
guns on the Western Front had no sooner fallen silent when the British Foreign Office 
asked the Admiralty to immediately send ships to the Baltic to enforce the continuing 
blockade of Germany and to establish relations with the Baltic countries. Throughout the 
British involvement in the Baltic, the Foreign Office, the Royal Navy, and Military 
missions on the ground worked closely together to meet national goals, in the long-
standing pattern of Britain’s involvement in Empire.  On 21 November, a squadron of 
light cruisers, destroyers, and minesweepers was ordered to the Baltic under Rear-
Admiral Sinclair, who flew his flag on HMS Cardiff.  Sinclair was to proceed to the port 
of Libau in Latvia and then on to Reval in Estonia.  He was ordered to show the British 
flag and support British policy as circumstances dictated.  On the subject of supporting 
the Baltic State governments, he was charged with supplying arms to the Estonians and 
Latvians, but also to make clear that no troops would be forthcoming.62  Admiral 
Sinclair’s squadron found itself menaced by tens of thousands of mines and plunged into 
a chaotic situation involving multiple civil wars and revolutions.  Britain was not at war 
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with Soviet Russia, but Admiralty instructions specified that “...a Bolshevik man-of-war 
operating off the coast of the Baltic Provinces must be assumed to be doing so with 
hostile intent, and should be treated accordingly.”63  During a refueling stop in Denmark, 
the British Ambassador relayed an urgent message to Admiral Sinclair from the Estonian 
leader, Constantine Pats, urging the Allied fleet to hasten to Reval before it fell to 
invading Soviet forces.  Sinclair sortied the next day, despite the unavailability of 
minesweepers.64 
Upon arrival in Reval, Sinclair was immediately forced to make a variety of 
decisions that involved coercion and dissuasion/persuasion.  The Red Army was now 
only forty miles outside the capital, and a frantic Prime Minister Pats requested a British 
Army battalion and a fleet to defend the capital, and even sought to make Estonia a 
British protectorate.  Meanwhile, the White Russian Army of the North-West, retreating 
from Pskov, sought money and a British liaison.  Sinclair refused this last request, 
suspicious of the White army’s intentions in Estonia.  To Pats he promised conditional 
support of arms and training, if the Estonian National Council ceased its squabbling and 
showed a united front.65  The following day Sinclair elected to expand on his limited 
orders by conducting a bombardment of the Red Army rear areas, effectively halting the 
Bolshevik offensive by destroying the bridges over which Red supply columns flowed.  
During several naval skirmishes over the next few days, two Bolshevik destroyers were 
captured when they attempted a counter-bombardment.  Cowan subsequently turned 
these ships over to the nascent Estonian Navy, notwithstanding the objections of the 
White Russians.66 
On 19 December, Sinclair sent several units to the Latvian port of Riga under the 
command of Captain H.H. Smyth.  Smyth found conditions in Latvia were even worse 
than in Estonia.  The German Army was preparing to withdraw and leave its arms and 
                                                 
63 Bennett, 34.  
64 The British “Town” class minesweepers were coal-fired.  Their coal-collier had been sunk en-route 
by a mine in the North Sea, forcing the minesweepers to stay behind in Copenhagen.  In the event, the 
cruiser HMS Cassandra was sunk by a mine the next night during the passage east through the Baltic.            
65 Bennett, 36-9. 
66 The Bolshevik Fleet Commander, Admiral Raskolnikov, was captured on Spartak.  He was found 
hidden under twelve bags of potatoes.  In June 1919, he was exchanged for 18 British prisoners.            
54 
supplies to the oncoming Bolsheviks.  Smyth immediately pressed the German High 
Command to meet its Article XII treaty obligations.  When the Red advance continued 
without visible opposition by the Germans, Smyth made it forcefully clear that the Allies 
viewed the general Armistice peace as in jeopardy.  This had little effect on the Germans, 
who secretly planned to force the desperate Latvian government to seek help on German 
terms—terms which included colonization by demobilized German soldiers.67    
Meanwhile, the British had landed arms for the Latvian government forces, suppressed a 
Bolshevik inspired mutiny of two Latvian regiments by means of naval bombardment, 
and begun gathering British subjects and dignitaries in preparation for evacuation.  Smyth 
communicated his increasingly precarious position to Sinclair and the Admiralty, 
requesting further assistance.  In London, however, conditions had once again changed.  
On December 30th, President Woodrow Wilson declared that America would not become 
further involved in Russian affairs, and would seek to become disentangled entirely.  The 
following day, Prime Minister Lloyd George ordered Sinclair’s squadron to withdraw 
from the Baltic, over the objections of the Admiralty.68  Sinclair informed the Latvian 
government that he would not be able to provide any further assistance.   
On 6 January, Sinclair sailed for Copenhagen and home. While on passage, 
conditions changed once again.  The announcement of Britain’s intention to withdraw 
prompted the new German commander in the Baltic, General Count von Goltz, to seize 
the opportunity offered and establish an armed camp to promote German interests.  This 
alarming development in turn led to the Admiralty sending another squadron of ships to 
the Baltic under Rear Admiral Sir Walter Cowan, who met Sinclair in Copenhagen.  The 
Admiralty’s orders to Cowan were to prevent raids on Baltic coastal towns, thwart 
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2. Britain Begins Dissuasion Operations in the Baltic  
Before sailing for the Baltic, Admiral Cowan summarized the situation thus: “It 
seemed to me that there never was such a tangle… An unbeaten German army, two kinds 
of belligerent Russians, Letts, Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians, ice, mines—60,000 of them! 
Russian submarines, German small craft, Russian battleships, cruisers and destroyers all 
only waiting for the ice to melt to ravage the Baltic.”70  Cowan’s misgivings, however, 
could be partly allayed by the overwhelming maritime force the British would deploy to 
the Baltic—the superiority of the Royal Navy would allow Cowan to readily take 
advantage of opportunities as they emerged. 
The confused situation in the Baltic was reflected in London, where various 
factions within the war cabinet pushed their own agendas.  Admiral Wemyss, the First 
Sea Lord, lamented the divisions within the British Government:  
The situation as regards the operations now being carried out by the Navy 
in the Baltic Provinces is one that calls for consideration with a view to 
determining our future policy… Demands for assistance of all kinds are 
being made… The time has come for a decision as to our future policy.  
We have already lost one new and efficient light cruiser and 11 lives.  The 
existence of the Bolshevik Navy…cannot be ignored.71   
Over the next few months, however, British policy began to coalesce around the 
notion that Britain’s primary aim should be the viable and continued independence of the 
Baltic States.  E.H. Carr, Foreign Office Third Secretary, summarized,  
It is most undesirable that General Yudenitch (Commander of the White 
Russian North-West Army) should be in any way encouraged to interfere 
in Finland or Estonia or to make either of these countries a base for 
offensive operations…[the] result would probably be the sweeping of 
Estonia, and possibly Finland, by Bolshovism.72   
Britain wished to support White Russian efforts to defeat Bolshevism, but not at 
the expense of the independence of the Baltic States, and would use dissuasion to keep 
the Russians out of the Baltic.  In point of fact, Britain was coming to the realization that 
it would likely be forced to coexist with the government of Bolshevik Russia in the 
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future, and accordingly instructed the chief of the military mission, General Hubert 
Gough, to concentrate on establishing British influence in the Baltic and not to imperil 
relations with the likely future government of Russia.73  In May Georges Clemenceau 
affirmed Allied Power willingness to assist the White Russians, but only on condition 
“…that there be regulation of mutual relations with the newly formed boarder states with 
the concurrence of the League of Nations, pending which, their autonomy was 
recognized.”74         
On 9 February 1919, Admiral Cowan sent a ship to supply the Latvian Army with 
arms and ammunition, which failed to prevent the overthrow of the Latvian government 
by a German-backed puppet regime in April.  The situation was also deteriorating in 
Estonia, where a Red offensive was pushing back the Estonian and Russian White 
Armies.  Leaving Latvia for the moment, Cowan sent most of his ships to support the 
Estonian Army’s left flank.  Of great concern to Cowan, two powerful Bolshevik 
battleships lay at the Russian port of Kronstadt.  The rapid movement of ships that 
engaged in a wide variety of missions during this period demonstrates how well suited 
naval forces can be to dissuasion missions, with their inherent mobility and flexibility.       
On 25 April, Hungarian Communists offered to mediate a settlement between the 
Bolsheviks and the Estonians, but Cowan threatened withdrawal of support to the 
Estonians unless they rejected the Hungarian offer.75  Over the next few months, 
commanders developed relationships with local leaders and a detailed awareness of local 
conditions, as Royal Navy units supported the Estonian and White counter-offensive with 
bombardment and amphibious operations, fought several inconclusive battles with Red 
naval forces, and supplied arms and ammunition to Estonian and White forces.  In June, 
Cowan decided to resolve the situation with the Red fleet once and for all.  On 18 
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August, a coordinated attack by British aircraft and fast motor torpedo boats on Kronstadt 
resulted in the sinking of two battleships, a destroyer, and a depot repair ship.76 
Meanwhile, Latvia’s situation had gone from bad to worse.  Riga fell to the 
German Army under General Goltz, confining the Latvian government to a single 
Latvian destroyer moored in the harbor.  Goltz formed an alliance with a Russian 
expatriate, Pawel Bermondt, who commanded an army of White Russians.  Bermondt 
attacked, scattering Latvian army units and treating Latvian civilians with such severity 
that it prompted the Allies to re-impose the blockade on Germany’s Baltic coast on 10 
October, demanding an immediate withdrawal of the German Army in Latvia.  Cowan 
and the other Allied naval commanders clamped down a total blockade on the German 
coast, preventing all shipping from entering German waters, even sealing German fishing 
craft in-port.  Without orders, Cowan and the other Allied commanders in the Baltic 
amplified the withdrawal demand, requiring the removal of all German soldiers from 
west of the Daugava river by noon on 15 October.  When these demands were not met, 
British and French warships began to shell German positions.  By 11 November, the 
majority of the German Army, dogged by shelling from Allied warships, withdrew into 
East Prussia.  Suffering under the effects of the naval blockade, the German government 
withdrew all German troops from Latvian soil by 30 October.  The immediate strategy of 
coercion used here supported the long term strategy of dissuading the Germans from 
interfering in Baltic State affairs.   
Also in October, the White Russian Army began its final offensive toward 
Petrograd.  The Estonians feared a White Russian victory as much as a Bolshevik one, 
and were reluctant to provide support to General Yudenitch, given that the White slogan 
was “Russia, One and Indivisible.”77   The British, striving to entice the Estonians and 
Russians toward the twin British goals of Baltic independence and the defeat of 
Bolshevism, once again threatened to cut off aid.   They demanded that the Russians sign 
an agreement with the Estonians granting independence, and insisted that the Estonians 
                                                 
76 The first Sea Lord sent a congratulatory message to Cowan, but the government saw this 
development with consternation, while still debating what course of action to take toward Russia.  See 
Anderson, 66. 
77 Page, 176. 
58 
provide support for the upcoming offensive.  Both parties reluctantly acquiesced.78  In the 
event, the offensive failed—despite support from Royal Navy and Estonian Army units—
and the White Army was driven back into Estonia.  The Estonians, fearing the loss of 
their hard won independence, disarmed the retreating Russians with British consent. 
Separately, each Baltic State began negotiations with Bolshevik Russia for peace, 
which the Allies half-heartedly opposed.  The British withdrew the majority of their fleet 
in the Baltic on 26 December, and the Estonian’s signed an armistice with Russia on the 
last day of 1919.  The Treaty of Tartu between Russia and Estonia was signed on 2 
February 1920, in which Russia agreed to recognize the independence of Estonia and 
renounce all rights to sovereignty over Estonian territory and her people.79 
The British left behind military advisory missions with each of the Baltic States, 
and a small naval squadron: in the ongoing competition for political sway and economic 
position Britain recognized the importance of military-to-military contact in influencing 
the future direction of the Baltic nations, especially since they would be dependent on 
outside suppliers for their arms.80 
Summarizing British involvement in the Baltic, the Estonian Commander-in-
Chief, General Laidoner, said that if the British fleet had not come in December 1918, 
“…we should have fallen into the whirlpool of Bolshevism, and the fate of the other 
Baltic Countries would have been the same.”81 
  
C. ANALYSIS: DISSUASION IN THE BALTIC         
After almost two years of hard sailing, the British fleet returned home.  With 
some minor exceptions, the British had avoided the commitment of ground troops in the 
Baltic, instead using its ready supply of naval power, limited military missions on the 
ground, and advisors from the Foreign Office to influence events.  While the goal of 
returning Russia to its pre- Bolshevik state failed, other British goals in the Baltic were 
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largely achieved: The spread of Bolshevism had been halted at the Russian boarder, 
buffer states were established between Germany and Russia, German forces had been 
removed from the area, and considerable British economic and political influence in the 
Baltic had been achieved.  Through careful application of dissuasion, deterrence, and 
coercion Cowan and a few other British officers positively influenced events in the Baltic 
to meet British ambitions.  
British dissuasion activity was aimed primarily at White Russian forces and the 
Baltic States.  The main tools used by Britain were conditional support (financial, 
military, and moral), and threatened withdrawal of support.  Three key episodes illustrate 
the efficacy of dissuasion: the prevention of White Russian intrusion into the Baltic 
States, the suppression of Hungarian communist influence in Estonia, and forcing the 
White Russian and Estonian armies to work together in the 1919 Fall Offensive.  British 
forces also used offensive and defensive military action, such as the destruction of the 
Red Fleet, to establish the security environment in which the Baltic States could achieve 
independence.      
In the larger theater, deterrence and coercion were used regularly.  British forces 
directly attacked interfering German forces, and imposed a crippling blockade on the 
German coast in order to force German compliance with treaty provisions and to eject 
German influence from the Baltic States. These strategies existed alongside dissuasion, 
but were also key components of the overall dissuasive goal of preventing interference 
with the newly established Baltic States. 
Naval forces proved particularly effective at advancing British interests in the 
Baltic.  The Royal Navy seemed to be everywhere in the Baltic, as Cowan moved his 
forces around rapidly to take advantage of shifting conditions, cooperating closely with 
allies, military missions on the ground, and Foreign Office agents.  The stable 
commitment of forces, with only two commanders over two years, increased RN 
effectiveness, as Cowan and his officers developed a detailed feel for the shifting 
conditions throughout the Baltic.  The adaptability and strategic mobility of naval forces 
proved key to British successes in the Baltic.   
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D. LESSONS FROM THE BALTIC 
Several lessons can be extracted from British Baltic operations between 
December 1918 and December 1919.   
        
1. Close Cooperation between All Instruments of Power is Required for 
Effective Policy Implementation  
Royal Navy, military missions on the ground, and Foreign Office officials 
cooperated closely to meet policy goals in the Baltic.  Although the relationship between 
the British Foreign Office and the Admiralty was not perfect, the Foreign Office did see 
the Royal Navy as a legitimate instrument of policy to be used to further national goals.  
Drawing on their long colonial experience, the British recognized that force and politics 
are intertwined and mutually supportive.  All too often, the United States State 
Department and the Pentagon see their missions as mutually exclusive and competitive, 
believing one takes over where the other leaves off, separated by the artificial barrier of 
war.  The military must be willing to advance national goals, even if it requires 
unconventional “non-warfighting” operations, while the State Department (and other 
state entities) must be willing to trust the military to judiciously exert influence overseas 
where appropriate. 
             
2. Operations Such as Those in the Baltic Require a Ready Military 
Capacity that Can be Employed without Excessive Strain on the Force    
A military heavily committed to its limits will be unable to easily support national 
goals at short notice.  The British found themselves with an excess capacity in 1919 as a 
result of the war buildup.  The British were only able to undertake the military 
component of its Baltic strategy because of the ready availability of highly trained forces 
available for immediate deployment; the reserve capacity to take advantage of situations 
“pregnant with formless menace, offering obscure opportunities” must be maintained.   
        
3. Navies are Well Suited to Operations that Veer Rapidly between 
Dissuasion, Deterrence, and Coercion   
Unlike ground forces, a navy can be rapidly moved to trouble spots from over the 
horizon, then withdrawn or inserted as the situation dictates.  Cowan’s units in the Baltic 
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frequently found themselves rapidly moving from supplying Baltic State forces, to 
deterring German armies, then on to attacking Bolshevik forces.  The inherent operational 
mobility and flexibility of naval forces gives them a unique ability to exert the right type 
of influence at the right place and time.       
 
4. The Relative Power of Real and Potential Adversaries is of Primary 
Consideration in the Decision to Undertake Operations Like Those of 
the British in the Baltic   
Dissuasion often requires a superior correlation of forces; coercion always 
requires it.  In the Baltic, the overriding preponderance of Allied power allowed 
operations against the Germans and Bolsheviks that would not have been possible had a 
more balanced correlation of forces existed.  Contrast, for example, the situation in the 
Baltic following the disintegration of the German and Russian empires to the 
circumstances subsequent to the break-up of the Soviet Union.  In the words of James 
Cable, “In 1991 it would have been inadvisable for a U.S. squadron to cruise off the 
coasts of the Soviet Union in readiness to exploit turmoil ashore in the interest of U.S. 
policy.”82      
  
5. Continuous and Long-Term Presence Matters   
Complex operations require a detailed knowledge of local conditions to be 
successful.  The British kept a significant force on-station for over two years, with only a 
single command change, allowing the Commander to develop a feel for important 
subtleties in a fluid situation.  The highly confused situation in the Baltic mirrors many 
regions around the world today.  Politicians and Commanders must be willing to commit 
forces for long periods of time with a stable leadership turnover.  Local commanders 
need time to develop knowledge of complex situations on the ground in order to apply 
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6. Military-to-Military Contact Can Exert an Important Influence   
Military-to-military contact provides multiple avenues to exert influence, through 
personal relationships, access to various levels of government in the target state, and the 
economic influence offered by arms trade.  British officers advised and trained the 
militaries of the Baltic States, creating a reservoir of goodwill and influencing policy in 
positive directions.  The establishment of permanent military missions continued this 
influence.  Arms trade (or outright grants of military equipment) can also establish well-
worn paths for foreign militaries to purchase arms, creating influence through “sunk cost” 
thinking and repair parts deals. 
 
7. The Mind-Set and “Strategic Culture” the Target Plays a Most 
Important Role in Choosing How and When to Apply 
Dissuasion/Persuasion or Coercion policies  
Strategic culture works to limit the acceptable options open to the target of 
dissuasion.  A clear understanding of the target’s strategic culture is required if a 
dissuasion is to be successful.  The British liberally used dissuasion and persuasion on the 
Estonians and White Russians, for instance, by holding out offers of support (supplies, 
arms, money, training, and naval fire support) or threatening to withhold support.  These 
tactics clearly would not have worked on the Germans, forcing the British to adopt more 
aggressive compelence measures.       
         
8. Dissuasion Can Target Near-Term or Long-Term Behavior  
The British used dissuasion strategies to meet both immediate and long-term 
goals.   Dissuasive or persuasive methods forced the Estonians and White Russians to 
work together in the short-term for the October 1919 offensive, but were also used to 
draw the Baltic States into the long-term economic orbit of Britain, particularly with 
regard to naval arms trade.  Of note, Britain’s long-term aim of keeping Estonia and the 
other Balkan States in the fight against Bolshevism worked in the short-term but 
ultimately failed. The target of dissuasion must conclude that the benefits of compliance 
outweigh the benefits of non-compliance—as soon as this balance shifts, dissuasion 
losses its capability to influence. 
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These are some of the salient points that can be teased out of the British 
experience in the Baltic following the Great War.  Dissuasion may be hard to separate 
from the other elements of traditional gunboat diplomacy, but it does, in fact, have its 
own logic and can be operationalized in its own unique way.  Dissuasion can complement 




With the exception of returning Russia to her pre-revolutionary condition, 
Britain’s intervention in the Baltic proved highly successful.  At maximum effort, there 
were some 65 Royal Navy ships operating in the Baltic.  Over the two-year span of 
Admiral Sinclair’s and Admiral Cowan’s command, nine ships were lost with 171 men.  
Against this cost, three countries achieved their independence, a threatening German 
army was forced to return to Prussian soil, Bolshevik forces were driven back into 
Russia, and viable trade returned to the Baltic.  Dissuasion and persuasion strategies 
played a significant role in this list of successes as part of a larger strategy of classical 
gunboat diplomacy, shaping an entire region onto a path favorable to British interests.   
The lessons of Britain’s Baltic interlude, when properly applied, can help modern 
warriors and diplomats deal with the problems of the twenty first century.  Much like the 
Baltic of 1919, there are areas of the world where weak states and strong states compete 
with sub-state actors for influence in arenas of constantly shifting circumstances—only 
now, in an era of rapid global transportation and weapons of mass-destruction, the stakes 
may be much higher.   
The events detailed above bring home some valuable lessons:  coordinate action 
by all instruments of national power; maintain sufficient military capacity to deal with 
unexpected crisis and opportunity; employ carefully calibrated military force, especially 
naval forces that can remain on station and be committed or withdrawn as the situation 
dictates; maintain long term on-station contact, especially military-to-military contact; 
and take into account the strategic culture and mind-set of those we seek to influence.  
Collectively, these lessons from the 1918-1921 experience of the British in the Baltic can 
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V. FAILED DISSUASION CASE STUDY: THE BRITISH 
ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE GERMANY 1898–1913   
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the decade before the First World War, Britain failed to dissuade Germany 
from building a fleet that threatened the Royal Navy’s control of the seas.  The British 
used a variety of dissuasive techniques—including diplomatic engagement and building a 
navy of such size as to make effective competition impossible—but were ultimately 
defeated by fractional domestic politics and a German strategic culture resistant to 
alternative paths.  Britain’s concerted attempt at dissuasion provides valuable insight into 
the limitations of dissuasion.   
At the end of the nineteenth century, it became apparent to many Britons that the 
overwhelming dominance of British sea power that had existed since Trafalgar in 1805 
was no longer quite so overwhelming.  The difficulties encountered in the Boer War 
prompted many Englishmen to survey the world anew, elevating Britain’s waning naval 
dominance into the arena of public debate.  The British government and the Royal Navy, 
watching the “new navalism” sweep the globe, realized that maintenance of a navy 
superior to any combination of other nations was becoming impossible.  All around the 
world Royal Navy squadrons found themselves outclassed by local rivals: in the 
Caribbean, the new and powerful American navy, in the Far East the Japanese navy, and 
most of all in Europe, where the potential combination of French and Russian naval 
forces was greatly feared.  The emergence of rail transportation also meant that the Royal 
Navy could no longer be assured of monopolizing the means of transporting arms and 
armies, a particular source of alarm when Russian rail lines extended to the boarder of 
Afghanistan, threatening India.  British fleet policy was based on a “two power” standard 
for the Royal Navy, aimed primarily at a combination of the French and Russian fleets.  
As the nineteenth century turned to the twentieth, great efforts went into a complete 
realignment of the Navy: hundreds of older ships were discarded as “to weak to fight and 
too slow to run away,” in the words of First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher.83  The fleet was 
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reorganized to bring the majority of combat power home to European waters, after 
outstanding diplomatic issues with the United States were settled and an alliance with 
Japan in the Far East was forged.   
As the world experienced tectonic shifts in the geo-political situation that had 
existed since 1815, it also was undergoing profound technological upheavals.  This 
turmoil had a tremendous impact on naval technology, which underwent a revolution 
from wooden sailing ships, to steel-armored battleships firing high-velocity explosive 
shells, in less than 40 years.  These technological leaps raised the specter of the Royal 
Navy being made obsolete by a competitor’s unforeseen innovation.  Indeed, Britain’s 
navy made its own vast fleet obsolete during this period several times by adopting 
various sea-going innovations. 
Onto this rapidly changing world stage strode a powerful new Germany, riding a 
wave of population growth, new economic muscle, and nationalist sentiment.  Restless 
Germans took note of Britain’s century long Pax Britannia domination and concluded 
that sea power was the answer for Germany’s own aspirations.  Kaiser Wilhelm, Alfred 
von Tirpitz, and the new German navalists breathed in A.T Mahan’s theories, concluding 
that a powerful German navy was the key to taking a rightful “place in the sun.”84  In 
1898, the British faced down the French at Fashoda over a dispute over the Upper Nile, 
forcing the French into a humiliating retreat in the face of Britain’s overwhelming naval 
might, prompting the Kaiser to say, “The poor French… They have not read their 
Mahan!”85  
Germany’s naval buildup quickly alarmed Britain.  Initial unease at the thought of 
a Continental alliance directed against Britain turned to angst aimed at Germany alone, as 
the extent of German naval expansion became apparent.  The tension of naval matters 
became the single most important point of conflict between the two powers.  In the period 
1902–1913 Britain would pursue a vigorous policy of dissuasion directed at persuading 
Germany to abandon its plans for a battle fleet capable of wresting control of the seas 
from the Royal Navy.  Using diplomatic engagement, erecting technological and 
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financial barriers to competition, and forming an encircling alliance, the British 
government would try—and ultimately fail—to move Germany onto a path away from 
confrontation.  This chapter will examine the British effort and why it failed.  First, a 
historical study of Anglo-German relations in the period before the Great War will be 
presented, followed by an analysis of specific dissuasion strategies used.  Finally, lessons 
learned from this episode will be presented.  Table 1 provides a timeline of major events 
in the Anglo-German relationships in the period 1890–1914: 
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Table 1. Timeline - Decline in Anglo-German Relations, 1890–191486  
1890 A.T. Mahan publishes The Influence of Seapower On History, 1660-1783 
1890 18 March  Dismissal of Bismarck 
1891 27 August Franco-Russian Entente 
1892 17 August Franco-Russian Military Convention  
1893 17 January   Franco-Russian Alliance signed 
1895 June Opening of Kiel canal in Germany  
1896 3 January Wilhelm II sends ‘Kruger Telegram’ 
1897 Tirpitz becomes Navy IG   
1898 26 March First German Naval Bill passes the Reichstag 
1898 1 April Chamberlin suggests an alliance with Germany 
1899 12 October Boer War begins 
1900 14 June Second Navy Bill, proposed by Tirpitz, passes Reichstag 
1900 17 October Bulow becomes Reich Chancellor   
1901 20 January Kaiser Wilhelm arrives in London to visit his dieing grandmother, Queen Victoria  
1901 October-December Anglo-German alliance talks, which ultimately collapse  
1901 November “ABC” article published in the National Review, raising the alarm on the new 
German navy.  
1902 28 June Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) renewed   
1903 May Edward VII visits Paris, beginning a thawing of relations between Britain and 
France that would eventually lead to alliance.  
1904 4 February Russo-Japanese War begins 
1904 8 April Entente Cordiale reached between Britain and France  
1904 May Fisher becomes First Sea Lord  
1905 30 April Anglo- French military talks begin 
1905 27 May Russian fleet destroyed by Japanese at Tsushima 
1905 5 October HMS Dreadnought keel laid 
1906 5 June Third German Navy Law passes 
1907 1 January Sir Eyre Crowe circulates memo on the sources of German behavior and 
advocating a counter-balancing alliance with France.  
1907 15 June Second Hague Peace Conference 
1907 31 August  Anglo-Russian Entente  
1908 14 June Fourth German Navy Law passes 
1909 9 February HMS Dreadnaught launched  
1909 12 March British Navy bill passes for eight additional dreadnoughts following “Navy Scare” 
1911 9 February Churchill gives a widely reported speech aimed at Germany declaring the British 
navy a necessity and the German fleet a luxury  
1911 21 July Lloyd George warns Germany in his famous “Mansion House” speech.   
1911 25 October Churchill becomes First Lord of the Admiralty 
1912 7 February Kaiser announces new army and navy bills  
1912 March Churchill announces enlargement of Royal Navy and removal of Malta squadron 
to home waters.  New German naval building program announced.  Anglo-
German naval arms limitation talks collapse.        
1912 December German Ambassador informed that England would aid France in the event of a 
German attack.  Wilhelm II calls military conference in Potsdam in response. 
1913 26 March Churchill makes the first of several proposals for a naval building ‘holiday’ 
1914 28 June  Assassination of Franz Ferdinand   
1914 28 July Churchill orders fleet to wartime base at Scapa Flow  
1914 3 August Great War begins  
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B. BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RIVALRY 
Anglo-German enmity emerged in a very short period at the turn of the nineteenth 
century.  German attitudes toward Britain began to change when Kaiser Wilhelm II took 
the imperial throne, and with popular opposition to British actions in the Boer War.  
Britain’s view of Germany began to seriously deteriorate when it became apparent that 
Germany intended to build a navy to challenge the Royal Navy’s domination of the seas.             
 
1. The Challenge from Germany Emerges 
The rapid expansion of the German navy grew out of swift industrialization and 
population growth, which generated a concurrent interest in overseas trade and colonies.  
Once the Kaiser dismissed the great Chancellor Bismarck in 1890, German foreign policy 
became altogether more restless and aimed at the heart of British interests.  The fall of 
Bismarck and his replacement as Chancellor by Prince Bernard von Bulow in 1897, and 
the appointment of Alfred von Tirpitz as Secretary of State for the Navy, marked an 
abrupt shift in Anglo-German relations.  In June 1897, at his first audience with the 
Kaiser, Tirpitz laid out his vision: 
For Germany the most dangerous enemy at the present time is England.  It 
is also the enemy against which we most urgently require a certain 
measure of naval force as a political power factor…our fleet must be so 
constructed that is can unfold its greatest military potential between 
Heligoland and the Thames… The military situation against England 
demands battleships in as great a number as possible.”87   
Wilhelm enthusiastically agreed:  
[It must] threaten English coastal towns, while British sea power was busy 
in the Mediterranean against France or perhaps simultaneously against 
Russia in Far Eastern Waters – a circumstance whose possibility people in 
England could not fail to perceive… Only when we can hold out our 
mailed fist against his face, will the British lion draw back…88 
Both Wilhelm and Tirpitz made twin assumptions that Britain would be forced to 
keep the lion’s share of the Royal Navy off tending the British Empire, and that the 
                                                 
87 Paul Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Ashfield Press, 1980), 
224.   
88 Ibid. 
70 
British would not see and respond to changing strategic circumstances.  These 
assumptions would prove to be catastrophic for Germany and Europe.      
As the nineteenth century waned, Britain still feared her ancient enemy France 
above all others, prompting First Sea Lord Selborne to advocate a formal alliance with 
Germany as a counterbalance to a French-Russian alliance.  This early effort was undone 
by an upwelling of mutual acrimony in the press over the Boer War, a burgeoning trade 
rivalry, and most specifically, by the inflammatory “Kruger Telegram” Kaiser Wilhelm 
sent to Transvaal President Kruger offering congratulations for repelling a British 
sponsored attack.89  In Germany, Chancellor Bulow soon abandoned an early tentative 
attempt to bind Britain to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, 
instead seeking German dominance of world affairs via a new policy of “weltpolitik,” or 
world politics.  Bulow understood his role to be one of providing political cover for 
Germany while the fleet was built up through the “danger zone” (the danger zone was the 
period where the fleet was sufficiently large to make Britain nervous enough to 
contemplate a preemptive “Copenhagen” attack, but not yet strong enough to defend 
itself).  He noted “the task which was given to me in the summer of 1897 was: 
development of our commerce, transition to weltpolitik, and especially the creation of a 
German fleet without collision with England, whom we are no match for.”90     
The First Navy Law of 1897, which kicked off the German naval expansion, was 
initially viewed with disquiet by the Admiralty because they believed that it might trigger 
a concurrent expansion of the Dual Alliance French and Russian fleets.  At the turn of the 
century, France was still the enemy of old to the British, while Russian railway-enabled 
expansion toward Afghanistan was viewed as a challenge to British hegemony on the 
Indian subcontinent, by circumventing Britain’s sea power.  Britain’s naval building 
policy was based on the two-power standard of maintaining superiority over the next two 
largest navies combined: the French and Russian navies.  This view began to shift by 
1900 when it was realized that Germany could potentially join the Duel Alliance, 
destroying the balance of power in Europe that had held since 1815.  When Lord 
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Lansdowne became Foreign Secretary in 1900, he was directed to ensure that Germany 
didn’t join in with any Continental alliance aimed at Britain: “We should use every effort 
to maintain and, if we can, to strengthen the good relations which at present exist 
between the Queen’s Government and that of the Emperor.”91   British observers were far 
more disturbed by the outbursts of popular anti-British feeling in Germany than the First 
Navy Law of 1898 or the Second Navy Law of 1900.  The German press was violently 
anti-British, especially during the Boer War.  These outbursts redoubled whenever the 
Kaiser erratically veered into one of his more pro-British moods.92   
The Kaiser spent considerable time in England with his extended family during 
his grandmother Queen Victoria’s death watch in 1901.  During this period he grew 
enthusiastic about an alliance between Germany and Britain, but Bulow did his best to 
dampen any move in this direction: “Everything now depends on neither discouraging 
nor encouraging the English”, he cabled, “nor allowing ourselves to be prematurely tied 
to them.  English troubles will increase…and with them the price that we can 
demand…”93  The Kaiser’s renewed warmth for his British cousins represented an 
opening that British diplomacy failed to take advantage of.  From this point on, the 
window of opportunity for successful dissuasion was closing rapidly, pushed shut by 
growing public animosity and fundamental refusal to understand each other’s positions. 
By 1902 British fears were aimed directly at the growing German fleet: Selborne told the 
Cabinet, “I am convinced that the great new German navy is being carefully built up from 
the point of a war with us….”94                  
The two power standard, which had previously been directed at a French-Russian 
combination, was reassessed after the Japanese navy annihilated the Russian fleet at the 
battle of Tsushima in 1905.  The Royal Navy argued that the German fleet was a much 
greater threat than Russia’s denuded fleet.  The Director of Naval Intelligence wrote that 
it was now necessary “to maintain a force in the North Sea sufficient to mask the German 
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Fleet.”95  Accordingly, the two-power standard was applied to France and Germany.  
Here the first attempt at dissuasion becomes apparent: The British publicly and 
diplomatically pointed out to the Germans that British supremacy at sea would be 
maintained regardless of the financial burdens.  Tirpitz’s calculation that a competitive 
German navy could be fielded without the British responding, due to world-wide 
commitments of Empire, proved deeply flawed from the start.96  British suspicions were 
raised to such an extent that even as early as 1902, when the Kaiser visited England he 
was deeply shocked by the hostility shown toward the German government, cabling 
Berlin that the German press must be muzzled before a crisis erupted, “[C]areful! They 
have 35 battleships in service here, and we have only 8!!”97             
   
2. British-German Relations Collapse 
When Jackie Fischer took over at First Sea Lord in October of 1904, the 
redeployment of the fleet to home waters accelerated in a further dissuasive move, a fact 
not lost on German observers (nor were calls for a “Copenhagen” of the German fleet in 
the British press, which caused a brief panic in Germany).  Royal Navy fleet 
redeployments were enabled by diplomatic initiatives that moved Britain away from its 
centuries-long policy of “splendid isolation.”  In 1901 Britain concluded a formal alliance 
with Japan, and in 1904 an “Entente Cordiale” was reached with Britain’s ancient rival, 
France.  British Foreign Minister Lascelles held a pointed conversation with German 
Ambassador Metternich making it clear that German fleet policy was the main obstacle to 
good relations between their two nations, and that the British people would never allow a 
superior navy in European waters.  The British were erecting a seemingly insurmountable 
barrier to effective German competition by accelerating ship building and redeploying 
powerful fleet assets to home waters.  Metternich passed Lascelles’ message on to Berlin, 
where it was becoming clear that Tirpitz’s fleet would exist in the danger zone for some 
time—perhaps forever.  Rather than accepting this verdict, however, the Germans 
redoubled efforts to build a fleet capable of taking on the Royal Navy, which Britain 
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again reluctantly responded to.98  As First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher said in 1906, “Germany 
keeps her whole fleet always concentrated within a few hours of England.  We must 
therefore keep a Fleet twice as powerful concentrated within a few hours of Germany.”99  
Despite intense British activity, Germany’s strategic culture was proving unresponsive to 
dissuasive moves.  
Britain’s next move was at the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, where 
British diplomats raised the question of naval arms limitations, but the British and 
German positions were too far apart.  The recent introduction of a new class of 
battleships by the Royal Navy meant that any limitations would permanently codify 
British superiority at sea.  At the behest of Jackie Fisher, a revolutionary new ship was 
launched in 1906 that instantly made obsolete every other battleship afloat: HMS 
Dreadnought.  Eschewing the collection of various sized guns on all previous ships, she 
featured an armament of ten 12-inch guns.  Incorporating thick armored belts, and the 
first application of steam turbines on large ships, she was faster, better protected, and far 
more powerful than any existing ship.  Throughout the conference, British negotiators 
pointed out that Great Britain’s very survival depended upon its navy, while Germany 
still maintained the strongest military in the world even without a fleet.  The Germans 
maintained that her status as a world power demanded a navy commensurate with that 
status, and one that could protect her interests and defend the German homeland.  In the 
end, the second Hague Conference pushed the two countries farther apart in a growing 
atmosphere of mutual distrust and antagonism.  The failure of the conference ended all 
hope of a general European armaments settlement, and greatly damaged the prospects for 
a bi-lateral agreement between Germany and Great Britain, although the British 
government decided to forge ahead with another attempt on this path.100 
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Just prior to the Hague Conference, Sir Eyre Crowe, a prominent official at the 
British Foreign Office, circulated a memo that analyzed German history and motivations.  
The memo proved every bit as incisive and influential as Kennan’s famous Long 
Telegram on the motivations of Soviet behavior in 1945, crystallizing British policy 
toward Germany:  
[It is not for] British Governments to oppose Germany’s building as large 
a fleet as she may consider necessary or desirable for the defence of her 
national interests. It is the mark of an independent State that it decides 
such matters for itself, free from any outside interference, and it would ill 
become England with her large fleets to dictate to another State what is 
good for it in matters of supreme national concern… nothing would be 
more likely than any attempt at such dictation, to impel Germany to 
persevere with her shipbuilding programmes… It would be of real 
advantage…not to bar Germany’s legitimate and peaceful expansion, nor 
her schemes of naval development…provided care were taken at the same 
time to make it quite clear that this benevolent attitude will give way to 
determined opposition at the first sign of British or allied interests being 
adversely affected. This alone would probably do more to bring about 
lastingly satisfactory relations with Germany than any other course… 
[T]here is one road which, if past experience is any guide to the future, 
will most certainly not lead to any permanent improvement of relations 
with any Power, least of all Germany, and which must therefore be 
abandoned: that is the road paved with graceful British concessions—
concessions made without any conviction either of their justice or of their 
being set off by equivalent counter-services. The vain hopes that in this 
manner Germany can be “conciliated” and made more friendly must be 
definitely given up.101 
In 1906 and 1907, German government borrowing, most especially for the navy, 
had put national finances into a precarious position.  Political difficulties with direct 
taxation led to enormous increases in borrowing and ever higher interest rates.  German 
spending on the navy jumped from the equivalent of 10.5-million pounds in 1900 to over 
24-million pounds in 1913.  Highlighting the futility of Germany’s attempt to out-build 
Britain, Royal Navy expenditures in the same period rose to 51-million pounds.  As 
expenditures increased to meet the needs of the 1906 and 1908 Navy Bills, the German 
government’s credit rating fell, driving interest rates on government debt far higher than 
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that of France or Britain.  Nearly all of this barrowing was financed by The City banks in 
London.  This period marked a point where a determined effort to utilize financial 
leverage may have dissuaded Germany from further naval building efforts, but fractional 
politics and competing interests within Britain prevented any such effort.102   
The year 1907 saw the emergence of opposition within Germany to the massive 
building plan that was straining the countries finances.  It was becoming apparent that 
Tirpitz’s fleet would perpetually remain in the danger zone, and the German army began 
to mutter about diversion of resources and driving England into the French camp.  Even 
Chancellor Bulow grew increasingly queasy when contemplating the extent of German 
debt.103   In late 1907, once a three-way crisis between France, Britain, and Germany 
over colonial rights in Morocco appeared to be past, the British government once again 
contemplated an arms limitation agreement.  Wilhelm once again stubbornly resisted any 
softening by the German government, and a temporary budget surplus allowed Germany 
to announce in November that an additional four battleships per year were to be laid 
down.  The building race intensified, as politicians in both countries used the 
deteriorating relationship as ammunition in their own internal fights.104          
  
3. Final Attempts at Dissuasion 
By 1909, the naval race was the burning source of friction between Germany and 
Britain, consuming the attention of both sides.  In June of 1908 Germany passed its 
fourth Naval Law.  British Admiralty analysis of expanding German ship-building 
capacity, and an apparent ability to accelerate the completion of hulls currently on the 
shipways, forced a corresponding British Navy Bill for an additional eight dreadnoughts 
in 1909.  Tentative British approaches to the German government seeking a “naval 
holiday” from battleship building were taken as signs of weakness by the Emperor.  
Chancellor Bulow suggested that Britain was unable to withstand the financial strain of 
the naval race, and thought a deal might be struck for British neutrality in any continental 
war in exchange for recognition of British naval supremacy.  This, of course, was a 
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fundamental misreading of Britain’s interests and history: although England had 
abandoned splendid isolation with the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the entente with 
France, basic British policy was, and always would be, to ensure than no one nation 
gained hegemony over the continent of Europe.  As Lord Grey wrote, “The Germans do 
not realize that England has always drifted or deliberately gone into opposition to any 
Power which establishes a hegemony in Europe.”105  Any agreement that granted 
Germany a free hand in this regard was impossible.106  Aside from Britain’s long 
standing desire to oppose any power on the Continent that appeared to be gaining 
supremacy, Britain’s unique dependence upon maritime power meant that the sand in the 
gears of Anglo-German relations would always by the German navy.  Lord Selborne 
argued “Our stakes are out of all proportion to those of any other Power.  To us defeat in 
a maritime war would mean disaster of almost unparallel magnitude in history.  It might 
mean the destruction of our mercantile marine, stoppage of our manufactures, scarcity of 
food, invasion, disruption of empire.  No other country runs the same risks in a war with 
us.”107   
During negotiations over a proposed railroad to Baghdad, German officials were 
told by Lord Grey that German naval expenditures were “the test of whether an 
understanding is worth anything…[but Britain] cannot sacrifice the friendship of Russia 
or France” to reach an accord.108  These words, and many more like them, were passed 
directly to the Kaiser, which did nothing more than provoke tirades about the “blindness” 
of German diplomats.109  No Englishman raised to believe in the efficacy of sea power 
would have denied the Germans a navy commensurate in size and power with its growing 
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battlefleet manifestly aimed at the heart of Great Britain—demanded an uncompromising 
response, especially in the atmosphere of rabid Anglophobia that overtook Germany 
since the Boer War.110                       
Britain’s Liberal government that came to power in 1906 had swept into office in 
a landslide victory on promises to restrain naval spending.  Thus, the government 
desperately wanted to dissuade Germany from accelerating its battleship building 
program, especially when it came to light in December of 1909 that German yards were 
stockpiling material in excess of needs laid down in the Fourth Navy Law of June 1908.  
The public and governmental alarm generated became know as the “Navy Scare of 
1909.”  In order to dissuade Germany, Britain followed a duel-track policy of diplomacy 
and one-upsmanship in shipbuilding.  First Lord of the Admiralty Reginald McKenna 
submitted Naval Estimates for an additional six dreadnoughts, while British diplomats 
pressured Germany to allow mutual inspections to reduce suspicion.  Lord Grey 
expressed the British viewpoint in public Parliamentary sessions, and in private with the 
German Ambassador.  If Germany insisted, the race would be vigorously pursued:   
If we alone, among the great powers, gave up the competition and sank to 
a position of inferiority…we should cease to count for anything among the 
nations of Europe, and we should be fortunate if our liberty was left… 
There is no comparison between the importance of the German navy to 
Germany and our Navy to us.  Our Navy is to us what their Army is to 
them.  To have a strong Navy would increase their prestige, their 
diplomatic influence, their power of protecting commerce, but…it is not a 
matter of life and death to them…[as] it is to us.  No superiority of the 
British Navy overt the German Navy could ever put us in a position to 
affect their independence… Bur if a German Navy were superior to ours, 
they, maintaining the Army which they do…our independence, our very 
existence would be at stake….If I was asked to name one thing which 
would mostly reassure…Europe…I think it would be that the naval 
expenditures of Germany would be diminished, and that ours was 
following suit111 
British diplomats urged their German counterparts to allow naval attaches to 
inspect shipyards as a confidence building measure, but the Kaiser expressly refused any 
such scheme.  When it became obvious that Germany was accelerating its dreadnought 
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building program, there was little the British could do but inform Ambassador Metternich 
that England would respond in kind.  When Metternich passed this information on to 
Berlin, it was met with stony silence.  German intransigence ended debate within the 
British cabinet over the Naval Estimates: as Churchill wryly put it, “The Admiralty 
demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on 
eight.”112  The Scare also had the additional effect of pushing several influential Cabinet 
Ministers, most notably Churchill, into a permanent anti-German stance.  It also forced 
the Royal Navy to focus nearly all of its attention on Germany.  From this point forward, 
the two power standard would be dropped in favor of a policy of maintaining 60 percent 
superiority over a single enemy: Germany.113         
The British resignation after 1911 can be summarized in a Weekly Standard 
article from May 1912: 
Because of that formidable and threatening Armada across the North Sea, 
we have abandoned the waters of the Outer Oceans.  We are in the 
position of Imperial Rome when the Barbarians were thundering at the 
frontiers.  The ominous word has gone forth.  We have called home the 
legions…114          
By 1913, Germany was clearly loosing the naval arms race.  Tirpitz still believed 
that given enough time, German industry and technology would give his fleet an edge in 
European waters, but the redeployment of the Royal Navy to home waters, successive 
British technological innovations such as Dreadnought and centralized gun fire-control, 
and most significantly, the apparent readiness of the British public to bear any burden in 
order to keep control of the seas, led him to tell the Reichstag in February that he would 
accept a British naval superiority of 60 percent.  Concurrently with this, Churchill again 
proposed a naval building holiday, adding “…[E]expenditures on armaments, carried to 
an excessive degree, must lead to catastrophe, and may even sink the ship of European 
prosperity and civilization.”  But it was too late.  The Schlieffen Plan was in place, and 
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von Moltke, chief of the German General Staff, spoke for the German government and 
much of its population when he said “War, the sooner the better!”115                       
 
C. ANALYSIS: BRITISH FAILED ATTEMPT AT DISSUASION  
The growth of the German navy was inevitable, given the socio-economic factors 
changing Europe, and the worldwide navalism that prevailed.  Britain recognized this, 
and attempted to dissuade Germany from directing this growth onto a path that threatened 
British interests.  Britain had two demanding strategic imperatives—maintaining sea 
control and preventing a single power from dominating continental Europe.  These 
interests sometimes complimented each other, but more often worked against each other.  
At several points, Britain could have reached an agreement with Germany that would 
have ensured continued sea control, but only at the cost of giving Germany a free hand on 
the Continent.  That Britain was not willing to make this bargain, and Germany was not 
willing to forgo a powerful navy without Britain’s acquiescence on the Continent, 
essentially torpedoed any viable agreement between the two countries.  Their 
fundamental strategic interests were too far apart.  Indeed, the limited negotiations Britain 
and Germany did engage in only served to raise mutual suspicions and drive them further 
apart.   
When alliance talks and naval limitation agreements failed to bare fruit, Britain 
turned to a policy of erecting barriers to effective competition in order to dissuade 
Germany.  This strategy used three methods: rapid expansion of the British battlefleet 
through outbuilding Germany; forming alliances and resolving outstanding foreign 
disputes in order to redeploy combat power to home waters; and technological 
innovations such as HMS Dreadnought and centralized fire-control.  Although this 
strategy gave Britain a commanding lead in fleet power, it was unsuccessful at dissuading 
Germany from making the attempt to compete.  Britain failed to raise the barrier high 
enough to force Germany into the conclusion that effective completion was impossible—
Germans believed they had the capacity to out-build Britain right up until 1913. 
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Britain’s most powerful dissuasive weapon, the financial one, was never really on 
the table due to competing domestic interests.  Germany’s expansion, especially after 
1906, depended on loans from London, but fractious politics and devotion to free-trade 
principles prevented any attempt at killing-off Germany’s ship-building program through 
economic dissuasion.  Indeed, Germany’s dependence on outside credit for continued 
growth forced an internal debate in Germany on the idea that war was the only path out 
of the box they found themselves in.  As in London, Germany was not politically unified, 
and a careful reading of German domestic politics coupled with the right forms of 
financial pressure might have prompted Germany to moderate its fleet build-up, had 
Britain been able to overcome its own domestic squabbles.  
Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, Britain carried out a 
strategic communications plan aimed at dissuading Germany from building its fleet.  
Repeated public, private, and diplomatic statements aimed specifically at convincing 
Germany that Britain would bare any price in order to maintain supremacy at sea were 
passed to German officials and the press.  In the end, all of these statements failed to 
convince Germany to stand-down from their naval plan.  This brings up the final, and 
perhaps most important, point:  Germany’s strategic culture prevented effective 
dissuasion.  The combination of burgeoning German economic muscle, the Kaiser’s 
belief in the efficacy of sea power, and a growing militarization of German society all 
conspired to make a path away from building a great battle-fleet highly unlikely. 
 
D. LESSONS 
Several lessons can be drawn from the study of British attempts to dissuade 
Germany prior to World War I. 
   
1. Technological Leaps Can Put the Entire Board into Play   
Radical new technologies can have profound and unintended effects on all states.  
Dreadnought not only made the German navy obsolete, it also made the British navy 
obsolete.  The effect would have been even more profound had Dreadnought been 
German—contemplation of a “Copenhagen” of the German fleet surly would have gained 
greater currency in Britain in such a case.  Outside of the strictly military terms of a 
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technological leap, the wider effect must be considered. Dreadnought put a damper on 
any possibility of a naval limitations accord between Britain and Germany due to the 
manifest inferiority of the German fleet following her introduction.  No state will likely 
accept the voluntary imposition of permanent inferiority while they have the means to 
close the gap. 
 
2. Erection of Cost and Technological Barriers is Unlikely to Succeed as 
a Dissuasion Strategy when the Target State Believes It Can Compete   
A barrier strategy must present such an insurmountable barricade that the target 
state will not even attempt the competition.  Britain’s Naval Estimates were not 
sufficiently greater than Germany’s to prevent contemplation of a race for superiority in 
European waters.  Right up to 1913 Germany thought it could out build Britain, in spite 
of Britain’s demonstrated financial commitment and fleet redeployment. Local security 
considerations also may drive behavior: The vast superiority enjoyed by the Royal Navy 
did not dissuade states around the world from building fleets to deal with local rivals.        
    
3. Dissuasion Strategies are Susceptible to Failure by the 
Misinterpretation of the Strategic Environment   
A fundamental difference in perception of the security environment among the 
parties involved may prevent effective dissuasion.  Tirpitz’s incorrect assumption that 
Britain would be forced by world-wide commitments to concede local parity in the North 
Sea was the theoretical basis of the German building program.  This proved manifestly 
untrue; as Churchill noted, “It would be very foolish to lose England in safeguarding 
Egypt.” 
   
4. Competing Domestic Interests Can Doom a Dissuasion Strategy  
In a government susceptible to pressure by interest groups, the most effective 
tools for dissuasion may be off-limits if a consensus is not built.  German shipbuilding 
was primarily financed by British loans; the damage financial restrictions would have 
caused to powerful interest groups within Britain effectively put economic sanctions 
against Germany off-limits.  The lack of a commonly accepted strategy with regard to  
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Germany, and rival interests within the Cabinet, meant that the British missed an 
opportunity to stop the buildup in its tracks by leveraging its financial power over 
Germany.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The failure of Britain’s attempt to dissuade Germany from building a fleet that 
could challenge the Royal Navy for sea control demonstrates the difficulties inherent in 
influencing a determined competitor.  Britain subordinated its foreign policy to this 
singular goal, yet still failed to persuade Germany to turn aside from its goals.  A robust 
building response, fleet redeployment, and diplomatic engagement failed to collectively 
influence German policy.  The one method that might have worked—financial pressure—
could not be contemplated due to domestic political considerations.  
Ultimately, Britain’s policies allowed it to maintain maritime supremacy, but at 
no point was Germany’s build-up slowed by British actions.  This case study provides a 
cautionary tale for policy makers who attempt to implement dissuasive policies that run 
counter to the strategic culture of the target state.        
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. PUTTING DISSUASION TO WORK 
The strategy of dissuasion exists alongside and compliments other national 
strategies such as deterrence and coercion, but also uses those strategies as part of a larger 
attempt at dissuasion. Dissuasion is a framework for assembling a range of strategies—
including aggressive coercion—to influence the target. Dissuasion can be aimed at 
behavior or building capabilities, using a variety of techniques to persuade the target to 
adopt a stance acceptable to U.S. policy makers.  Bringing dissuasion out of the 
theoretical realm and into the real world involves the application of the techniques 
identified from the case studies in this thesis:  
• Erecting cost and technological barriers to competition, usually through 
presenting such an overwhelming force, technological lead, or “human 
capital” lead, that an opponent will conclude that effective competition is 
impossible.  
• Presence and engagement operations, which promote confidence in the 
effectiveness of U.S. power and provide avenues for dialogue.  
• Attempts to control the spread of technology such as embargo, interdiction, 
and legal restrictions. 
• Conditional support and the threatened withdrawal of support, which forces 
the target state to choose between going down an undesirable path or loosing 
U.S. military, economic, or moral aid. 
• Building influence through economic ties, which grants leverage and entrée 
into influential sections of the target’s society and government.   
 
With these tools in hand, a systematic dissuasion plan can be built by applying the 
following template to strategic goals: 
• Define the behavior to be dissuaded and the desired behavior.  Is the desired 
behavior within the range limits dictated by the target’s strategic culture?  
• Identify the forces (vectors) pushing the targets behavior toward and away 
from the undesirable behavior. 
• Select and apply tools for amplifying positive forces (vectors) and attenuating 
negative forces.   
• Continuously evaluate the effect dissuasion is having on the target. 
• Adjust to meet changing circumstances. 
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In two difficult challenges currently facing the United States—Iran’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons and China’s potential adoption of aggressive and expansionist polices—
dissuasion provides options for policy makers to influence the course of events.  
Applying the principles above to these two issues illuminates the potential and limitations 
of dissuasion. 
 
1. Iran   
Iran, as in the Libyan example, is vulnerable to economic pressure.  Embargoes, 
financial controls, and even blockade can be used to bring severe pressure upon the 
Iranian leadership to change course away from its nuclear ambitions.  This kind of 
pressure, however, will likely only be effective if it is applied by the entire international 
community.  Financial pressure brought by Europe and the United States alone will be 
unlikely to dissuade Iran, if they can turn to China and Russia for support (which brings 
to the fore the point that dissuasion must sometimes be applied to second-order targets 
such as China and Russia to meet primary strategic goals).   
If other forms of dissuasion are to be successful, again as in the Libyan example, 
engagement with Iran should be practiced by the United States to provide the opening for 
a change in Iranian policy.  In the final analysis, policy makers and operators must 
carefully analyze Iran’s strategic culture to find paths that are acceptable to the Iranian 
leadership and people.  When directed at a regime strongly motivated by ideology, 
dissuasive pressure is unlikely to achieve its goals if the target state has the means to 
resist. 
 
2. China   
China’s strategic culture must be accounted for when formulating a specific 
dissuasion strategy aimed at preventing the emergence of an expansive and aggressive 
Chinese foreign policy.  The strong nationalist sentiment that exists throughout China 
must be given room on the world stage to express itself while the West seeks to integrate 
China into the world system peacefully.  If Washington attempts to curtail Chinese 
influence or adopts an overt policy of containment, it will likely give ammunition to 
militaristic elements in Chinese society to push a more aggressive stance, much as British 
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public antipathy toward Germany allowed Anglophobic Germans to take control of 
policy.  As in the Anglo-German case, economic dissuasive pressure on China will be 
difficult to attempt due to domestic interests in the United States.  An economic 
dissuasion program will have to be built around a win-win scenario for diverse American 
interests, a very tough proposition indeed.   
Erecting barriers—such as overwhelming U.S. naval power—to military 
competition may be an effective dissuasive strategy, but care will have to be taken to 
keep the barrier so high that China will not be tempted to make the leap.  Even if this 
policy is successful, it likely will not prevent the continuing expansion of Chinese 
military power due to China’s local security concerns.  The aim should be to channel 
Chinese military power away from competing with the United States directly, not 
curtailing it completely.  Finally, changes in military capability—such as the expansion 
of the Chinese Navy—will ultimately change strategic culture.  Dissuasion policies must 
be constantly measured and adjusted to meet changing realities.    
 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following policy recommendations are based on the case studies in this 
thesis. 
 
1. Enhance Cultural Education   
Understanding the culture, especially the strategic culture, of the target state is 
vital to an effective dissuasion policy.  Navy leaders should continue the recent push to 
strengthening foreign cultural education for military officers and officials.  Building an 
effective dissuasion strategy requires a detailed knowledge of the target’s strategic 
culture, armed forces, domestic political scene, and economy.  As in the Anglo-German 
case, where the British misread Germany’s fundamental strategic culture, a poor 
understanding of the target state can contribute to adoption of dissuasion policies that are 
ineffective, or even harmful.   
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2. Seek Domestic and International Consensus before Pursuing 
Economic Dissuasion   
Economic strategies such as sanctions, technology controls, and blockade demand 
broad international consensus to be effective.  In contrast with other sanctions regimes, 
sanctions directed against Libya were universal, giving Tripoli a choice between slow 
economic strangulation and changing its policies.  By the same token, seek to mitigate the 
potential damage to domestic groups that may suffer losses from an economic dissuasion 
policy: Britain had an opportunity to dissuade Germany from further fleet expansion in 
1907, but could not contemplate using this economic weapon due to competing domestic 
interests.  
 
3. Consider Other Strategies as Part of an Overall Dissuasion Policy   
Within the context of a long-term dissuasion strategy aimed at behavior or 
capabilities, deterrence, coercion, and appeasement can be utilized as part of the tool-set 
to achieve dissuasive strategic goals.  In the Baltic and Libyan cases, deterrence, 
coercion, and appeasement were all used to affect the desired behavior. Naval strategists 
also should accept the fact that technology alone is not the sole source of military 
superiority.  The quality, talent, professionalism, and entrepreneurship of the officer 
corps must be nurtured to protect the basis of current and future dissuasion strategies.   
    
4. When Appropriate, Tailor Forces for Dissuasion   
Military forces can be specifically configured to enhance dissuasion. An 
examination of the tools of dissuasion leads to certain conclusions about force tailoring to 
meet strategic goals.  For instance, dissuading China’s Navy from building the 
capabilities and policies for an aggressive sea-control navy requires a U.S. Navy “barrier 
to competition,” composed of a large number of high-capability warships.  At the 
opposite extreme, dissuading a South American nation from nationalizing its oil 
infrastructure, or West African oil-producing nation from drifting into China’s orbit, 




smaller, robust, naval vessels suited to engagement in austere ports without an 
accompanying large logistics footprint, and military-to-military contacts such as Special 
Forces training missions. 
  
5. Seek Engagement, Even if Only at the Lowest Level   
Engagement provides the basis for mutual understanding and can provide the 
opening through which a state can change policy course.  Effective dissuasion strategies 
will use engagement to lay the ground-work for the targeted state to change its policies 
onto the desired path.  In the Libyan case, low-level engagement set the stage for 
rapprochement by defusing tension and providing an avenue for initial discussions.  
     
6. Continue Research into Dissuasion as a Strategy    
The understanding of dissuasion is in the very early stages, similar to the situation 
in 1945 with deterrence.  Further development of our understanding of dissuasion by the 
defense academic community and the military should be perused, to allow this powerful 
strategy to reach its full potential.                                              
          
C. CONCLUSION 
Dissuasion is a tool for policy makers to shape the international security 
environment into a form favorable to U.S. interests.  This thesis has illustrated dissuasion 
strategies by studying past cases where states sought to shape the behavior of other states.  
As political and military leaders contemplate implementation of dissuasion to meet 
strategic goals, a theme that is throughout this study requires consideration: Know Thy 
Enemy.  An effective dissuasion strategy must take into consideration the strategic 
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